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Abstract
Safe regression test selection (RTS) techniques let software testers reduce the number of test cases
that need to be rerun to revalidate new versions of software, while ensuring that no fault-revealing test
case (in the existing test suite) is excluded. Most previous work on safe regression test selection has
focused on specific safe RTS algorithms, rather than addressing the theoretical foundations of safe RTS
techniques in general. In this paper, we present a unifying hamework for safe RTS that supports the
analysis and development of safe RTS techniques. We show that every safe RTS technique is founded on
a regression bias, and we show how one can prove an RTS technique safe for a set of programs and testing
processes by eliciting the bias hom the technique and then proving that the bias holds or does not hold
for that set of programs and processes. We provide two general models for safe RTS techniques that can
be used as templates in proofs of safety. The fist model actually contains two formulations, both defined
in terms of finite automata. This fist model is inefficient; it does, however, provide the most general,
powerful, safe RTS algorithm possible, given some simple assumptions. We then define a generalized safe
RTS algorithm that is only marginally less powerful than the fhite automata method, and that provides
a template that simplifies the development of safe RTS algorithms. Finally, to illustrate the application
of our fiamework, we use it to analyze several existing safe RTS algorithms and their biases, and to
develop a new safe RTS algorithm for programs written in spreadsheet languages.
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Introduction

The cost of maintaining quality in new versions of software dominates the cost of software maintenance.
Many maintenance activities contribute to software quality; current practice emphasizes the use of regression
testing. When regression testing requires the creation of test suites, it can be particularly expensive. However,
in the maintenance phase (unlike the development phase), test suites from previous validation phases may
already exist, and we can reuse those suites. But in the attempt to reuse existing test suites, two problems
arise. First, should we reuse all, or only part of, the test suites? Second, what new test cases should we
develop to satisfy new specification requirements for the modified software? The first problem is known as
the regression test selection problem; the second problem is the test suite augmentation problem. Both of
these problems are important; however, in this paper we focus on the regression test selection (RTS) problem.
To solve the RTS problem, software testers must first decide whether or not to use all of the existing test
suite. Running all of the test cases in an existing test suite can consume an inordinate amount of time: for
example, one of our industrial collaborators reports that for one of its products - containing only about
20,000 lines of code - running the entire test suite requires seven weeks. On the other hand, omitting test
cases from the test suite can potentially result in the exclusion of a fault-revealing test case. If the testing

requirements do not forbid this risk, a regression test selection (RTS) technique (e.g. [2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15,
18, 19, 25, 29, 31, 32]) can be employed; such techniques select a subset of the test suite using heuristics or
analytic approaches.
Di erent RTS techniques satisfy di erent demands. The simplest RTS techniques select test cases randomly, whereas more complex techniques typically base their selection on code analysis and test execution
pro les. These di erent RTS techniques produce test suites that have di erent fault-detection capabilities,
and generate test suites that are nonequivalent in terms of meeting customer requirements. In this paper,
we focus on RTS techniques that are required to be safe [5, 11, 18, 26, 29]. Safe RTS techniques select
(under certain conditions) every test case from the original test suite that can reveal a fault in the modi ed
program. For maintainers of safety-critical applications, such conservatism can be essential; however, even in
less critical domains, incurring the extra costs of employing safe rather than non-safe RTS techniques might
be preferable to releasing faulty software.
Previous research has produced several algorithms for safe RTS. These algorithms all employ similar
methods in that they compare source code or program representations for a program and its modi ed
version to locate lexical di erences, and select test cases associated with those di erences. For example, the
Rothermel/Harrold tool DejVu [26], the Vokolos/Frankl tool Pythia [29], and the family of techniques by
Ball [5] use direct lexical comparisons of source code statements, relying on control ow information to locate
test cases that could reach code that has changed. An approach by Laski and Szermer reduces the control
ow graphs for two versions of a program to a form in which modi ed regions of code can be identi ed [18].
The TestTube approach, created by Chen, Rosenblum, and Vo [11], uses checksum comparisons on the text
of entities in the global namespace: functions and variables, for instance.
As the previous descriptions indicate, most safe RTS techniques also rely, implicitly or explicitly, on
control ow information to identify changed code or test cases that must be re-executed. (The exception
is TestTube, whose simple analytic method operates at such a coarse level that control ow information
is neither stored nor required). Partially, this is because existing safe RTS techniques target imperative
languages. For functional languages such as Haskell and pure Lisp, for logic languages such as Prolog, and
for declarative languages such as those used in spreadsheets, however, control ow is not as signi cant a
component. In fact, constructing techniques based on control ow in these cases may be impossible, or may
mask opportunities for being more ecient.
Further, existing safe RTS techniques all require that code execute deterministically. Thus, even though
distributed and parallel imperative programs rely locally on control ow, they cannot easily be operated
upon safely by existing techniques. Also, existing safe RTS techniques do not account for nondeterministic
response times or nondeterministic event arrival times: thus, real-time and event-driven programs often are
dicult to accommodate using these techniques. We believe that these limitations are partially the result of
the lack of a general framework for safe RTS { a framework that speci es what safe RTS means with respect
to these di erent types of programs.
So far, little has been done to establish a set of requirements to govern, or a model with which to
evaluate, safe RTS techniques in general. Rothermel and Harrold [25] provide a framework for comparing
and analyzing regression test selection techniques [25], but that framework does not speci cally address
the foundations of safe RTS. Ball [5] addresses the theoretical foundations of control- ow-graph-based safe
RTS techniques such as DejaVu and shows that the process employed by these techniques is functionally
2

equivalent to the process of taking the intersection of deterministic nite automata. The primary focii of [5],
however, are control- ow-based techniques and issues of precision (the extent to which techniques succeed
in omitting unnecessary test cases).
The lack of a foundation for safe RTS makes proofs of safety for techniques dicult to achieve, yet
such proofs are essential if these techniques are to be deemed acceptable fo use in validating safety critical
software. The lack of a foundation also obscures the unique needs of di erent varieties of programs and
testing situations to which safe RTS might be applied.
In this paper, we present a unifying framework for safe RTS algorithms, that supports the analysis,
comparison, and creation of safe RTS algorithms generally. This framework de nes the properties that an
RTS algorithm must possess in order to claim safety. In particular, the framework establishes the concept
of a regression bias | the set of assumptions upon which the safety of an RTS technique is based | and
de nes a set of primitive entities out of which a model of a safe RTS technique, and a proof of safety of that
technique, can be built, given that the bias is satis ed by the program and testing process.
The framework also includes two general models for safe RTS techniques that can be used as templates in
proofs of safety. We rst de ne two formulations of a model based on nite automata; these two formulations
provide a theoretical basis for safe RTS, although they are not particularly ecient. We then present a
generalized safe RTS algorithm that generates a signature graph { a graph that guarantees that a test case
can be safely excluded if the trace of that test case for the original program P remains entirely within the
graph. This algorithm can be used as a template for new techniques that implement the generic functions
present in the algorithm, or it can be used to facilitate the analysis and comparison of safe RTS techniques.
We also present an extension to this general algorithm that is equivalent in precision to the second formulation
of the nite automata model, but more ecient at analyzing program di erences.
Finally, we illustrate the use of our framework. We rst show how the framework can be used to provide
a proof of safety for DejaVu, and sketching its use in providing similar proofs for Pythia and TestTube. We
then show how our framework can be used to develop a new safe RTS technique for use in testing spreadsheet
programs; this application also demonstrates how the technique can be applied to programs that are not
reliant on control ow for proper evaluation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material required
for the subsequent discussion. Section 3 describes the semantic framework for safe RTS, and presents both
formulations of the rst model of safe RTS. Section 4 describes the generalized safe RTS algorithm and
its template functions, and presents its more precise extension. Section 5 presents the applications of the
framework, including its use in the analysis and proof of DejaVu and other techniques, and in the creation of
a new instantiation of the generalized algorithm for use with spreadsheets. Section 6 presents conclusions.

2 Safe Regression Test Selection
Unlike software under initial development, software under maintenance may have already been partially
validated, through validation of previous versions. New functionality, of course, has not been subjected to
testing, and thus requires the creation of new test cases. Old functionality, however, may already have been
exercised with existing test suites; testers can revalidate this functionality and examine whether changes
have introduced new faults into old code by re-executing these existing test suites. Thus, the retesting of
3

modi ed software involves two distinct problems:
1. The problem of validating changed functional and non-functional requirements of the new version of
the program.
2. The problem of verifying that changes have not introduced faults detectable by the original test suites.
The rst problem requires validation of new and enhanced system components, and this requires the
development of new test cases: we call this the test suite augmentation problem. Changes to code can
also require development of new test cases, however, when no functional changes are made. In particular,
customer requirements (such as code coverage requirements) for the testing process that were previously met
might, following modi cations, fail to be met, requiring test case creation. In either case, this task resembles
the original development-phase testing process rather than the regression test selection process that this
paper targets, so we do not address it here.
The second problem requires revalidation of old non-obsolete functionality and requirements using existing
test cases: this is the regression test selection problem and is the focus of this paper.
Throughout the rest of this paper we use P to denote a program, P to denote a modi ed version of
P , and T to denote an existing test suite for P . The regression test selection problem, then, involves
selecting a subset T of T for use in revalidating P . Not all test cases in T necessarily apply to P : changes
in functionality, for instance, might make some test cases obsolete. An obsolete test case is any test case t
whose behavior in P is speci ed to be di erent from the correct behavior of t in P [22]. If we remove all such
test cases from T , however, we can then execute the remaining test cases in T on P and thereby (partially)
revalidate P . Reusing all non-obsolete test cases in this manner is known as the retest-all approach. This
approach does o er advantages to testers who must completely re-verify P : while testers still pay the cost
of test case execution, they do not pay the cost of test case development.
Of course, even though the retest-all technique employs only non-obsolete test cases, many of those test
cases may exercise code that is una ected by the changes that generated P . The retest-all approach can
involve unnecessary e ort as it requires that we exercise each release with the entire test suite even if the
changes in that release were insigni cant. RTS techniques address this problem by selecting only a subset of
the test suite to rerun, eliminating other test cases. In this paper, we are primarily interested in safe RTS
techniques, which, informally, eliminate only test cases that are provably not able to reveal faults.
Before we can provide a more precise de nition for the safety of an RTS technique, we require several
preliminary de nitions. The rst of these, a de nition of deterministically fault revealing, is fundamental to
safe RTS as we de ne it in this paper.
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

De nition 1. Deterministically Fault Revealing (DFR): Given a program P and a test
suite T , we say that T is deterministically fault revealing (DFR) for P if, for each test case t in
T , t exhibits identical failures on every execution of P .

Note that for T to be DFR for P , it is not necessary that T cause P to exhibit deterministic behavior. A
test suite can be DFR for P even though P exhibits random behavior; faulty behavior, however, must occur
deterministically or be deterministically detectable.
4

Testers frequently attempt to make program behavior deterministic for the testing scenario.1 Part of
the justi cation for doing this is to ensure that failures occur deterministically (ensuring DFR). However,
there are many other important reasons for ensuring deterministic testing. For instance, failing to ensure
determinism can make fault localization impossible: it is dicult to correct a fault that cannot be reproduced. Further, nondeterministic behavior under test can have disturbing e ects on test quality measures at
regression test time. For example, if a test case causes nondeterministic program behavior, it may exercise
di erent branches than those it is designed to exercise, and thereby fail to cover components that it is required to cover, and fail to achieve the quality goals required of it. Further, suppose that we cannot ensure
that a test suite is deterministically fault revealing: in that case, not even the retest-all technique can ensure
that faults are deterministically revealed by that test suite. Thus, it is not clear what conclusions we can
draw about program quality relative to the regression test suite using any form of test reuse if we cannot
ensure that test suites are DFR.
Therefore, in this paper, we assume that all safe RTS techniques implicitly require test suites to be DFR
for programs under test.2 As we discuss later, this assumption merely constrains the set of programs and
testing methodologies over which a particular RTS technique is safe.
If a test suite has been run on P and exhibits no failures, testers often make an additional assumption
related to DFR: P is correct for T . If T is DFR for P , and T exposed no faults in P , then T is unable to
expose faults in P ; thus, P is correct for T .

De nition 2. P Correct for T : Test suite T is incapable of exposing faults in P .
Regardless of the assumptions underlying the regression testing process, however, an important goal of
that process is to identify the fault-revealing subset of test suite T .

De nition 3. Fault-Revealing Subset: Given a test suite T and program P such that T is

DFR for P , there exists a subset of T , TFR , such that TFR contains all and only the test cases
in T that will reveal faults in P when executed on P .

There is no algorithm to precisely identify, in general, the fault revealing subset of a test suite [25]; thus,
safe RTS algorithms attempt to identify a superset of this subset. This prompts the following de nitions of
metrics for use in evaluating selected subsets of T .3

De nition 4. Inclusiveness: Given test suite T with fault revealing subset TFR, and T  T
where T contains m fault-revealing test cases, the inclusiveness of T is 100  TmFR %, where if
0

0

0

j

TFR = 0, inclusiveness is de ned to be 100%.

j

A notable exception is the explicit nondeterministic testing of concurrent programs (e.g. [10].)
Although we do not examine the possibility in this paper, it is possible that RTS techniques might operate safely on nondeterministically fault revealing test suites in certain circumstances. For example, it might be the case that T is not DFR, but
that only some subset of T contains potentially fault-revealing test cases. In this case, we might de ne a subset of T called
TNDFR , or the non-deterministic fault-revealing test suite. A similar analysis to the one presented in this paper might be made
for that testing scenario, although the modi cations would not be trivial. In particular, while the validating power of a DFR
test suite is probabilistic in one dimension | in essence, by sampling the behaviors of P with T | the non-deterministic case
would be probabilistic in two dimensions | not only would it sample P with T , but the test cases in T would themselves be
probabilistic.
3 De nitions 4 through 6 are similar to de nitions presented in Reference [25]. Those de nitions, however, viewed precision
and inclusiveness as qualities inherent to a RTS technique, whereas here we use precision and inclusiveness with respect to a
particular test suite. We have chosen the alternative de nitions because RTS techniques can have profoundly di erent results
on di erent types of subject programs, as we shall discuss further in Section 3.
1
2
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De nition 5. Precision: Given test suite T with fault revealing subset TFR, and T  T , the
precision of T is 100  TTFR %, where if TFR = 0, precision is not well-de ned unless T = 0, in
0

j

0

j

j

0

0j

which case precision is 100%.

De nition 6. Safety: A safe RTS technique produces test suite subsets that are 100% inclusive
with respect to the base test suite T .

Of course, a safe RTS technique is worthwhile only when the cost E of running the entire test suite
exceeds the cost A of running the analysis techniques plus the cost S of running and validating the results
of the selected test cases [19]. Or, to phrase this relation equationally:

A+S E
If this property does not hold, then running a safe RTS algorithm is an inecient allocation of resources.4
Thus, the precision of a safe RTS algorithm is an important factor, because it a ects both the size of the
selected test suite and the cost of the analysis. How one accounts for cost is critical to the above relation: for
example, time spent by humans on validation may be valued more than time spent by machines on analysis.

3 A Semantic Framework for Safe RTS Algorithms

3.1 Behavioral Equivalence And Regression Biases

Safe RTS techniques, like non-safe RTS techniques, select a subset of the test cases in an existing test suite.
Unlike non-safe techniques, however, safe techniques act as proofs that the excluded test cases cannot reveal
faults in a given modi ed version of a program. In particular, safe RTS techniques attempt to prove test cases
fault-behavioral equivalent over a program and a subsequent version of the program. Of course, providing
such proofs over an unrestricted population of programs and testing methodologies is not possible. Instead,
safe RTS techniques specialize in particular types of programs and testing methodologies: for example,
deterministic programs written in C, with test cases that terminated and revealed only correct outputs on
their previous execution on P [26].
The situations in which safe RTS techniques apply are further re ned by the use of simplifying assumptions about the environment of program execution: for example, a particular technique might require that
the same compiler generate the code for P and P , and that the test suite T execute in the same operating
system for P as for P . In addition, requirements speci cations often give leeway in judging software correct:
for instance, response times might have some bound, and if a technique can show that a test case does not
cause response time to exceed that bound, that test case can be assumed fault-behavioral equivalent for
P and P . Appropriate assumptions about environment, testing methodology, and program behavior let
RTS techniques be both safe and ecient, provided the assumptions are not violated. Such assumptions
constitute the regression bias of a safe RTS technique.
Although we have not yet formally de ned \regression bias", our informal discussion of the notion so far
places it as a set of assumptions concerning not only the program code itself, but also the environment in
which the the program is regression tested, and the test suites and testing methodology used to test it. These
three aspects constitute a gestalt of program behavior under test, and safe RTS techniques depend on all of
0

0

0

4

For a more detailed consideration of the issues involved in analyzing the economic trade-o s of RTS techniques see [14].

6

these aspects. However, constantly referring to the program and environment and test suite proves clumsy,
and introducing a new de nition seems unnecessary. Thus, in the following, we use the term \program"
to refer to both code and signi cant in uences in the external computing environment. Oftentimes, safe
RTS techniques will factor out external environmental in uences, in which case \program" refers only to
code, but the distinction we make here points out that such a factorization is not always safe. Test suites,
however, remain separate from this usage of \program": while separating the terms adds verbiage, merging
them endangers the fundamental meaning of the term program.
Given this clari cation, we present precise de nitions of fault-behavioral equivalence and regression biases:

De nition 7. Fault-Behavioral Equivalence: Given test case t and programs P and P , P
0

and P are fault-behavioral equivalent over t if the execution of t on P and P produces either
no failures or identical failures.
0

0

De nition 8. Regression Bias: The set of assumptions on which a safe RTS technique

constructs implicit deductive proofs that a subset of a test suite T contains all fault-revealing
test cases in T . (Such a bias holds for a subset of all possible programs and test suites.)

De nition 9. Biased Fault-Behavioral Equivalence: Given test case t, programs P and

P , and regression bias R, P and P are said to be R-Fault-Behaviorally Equivalent over t if R
holding implies that P and P are fault-behavioral equivalent over t.
0

0

0

In regression testing, we want to prove P and P fault-behavioral equivalent over existing test suites (after
obsolete test cases have been removed from the test suites). To establish the safety of an RTS technique,
we must show that the technique proves P and P R-fault-behavioral equivalent for some regression bias
R, where R is actually satis ed in the testing environment. This is a rather strict requirement in that it
requires the bias R to always hold in that environment; of course, if the tester can distinguish a subset TF
of T for which the bias fails, the tester can apply the RTS technique to T ? TF , and then add all test cases
in TF to the selected set T .
Further, while we are interested in this paper in techniques with regression biases that hold 100% of
the time on programs within their intended range of application, some testers might also choose to accept
\virtually safe" RTS techniques that fail on rarely occurring subject programs, where failure might mean
k% inclusiveness. In this paper, we will not consider such techniques: we require 100% inclusiveness. Much
of the framework presented in this paper, however, would be applicable to such virtually safe techniques.
We have de ned a regression bias as a set of assumptions; this yields a set of characteristics we can use
to partition the space of all programs. However, regression biases can also be viewed as sets of programs:
the sets over which the assumptions hold. Thus, we shall sometimes use regression biases to describe sets of
assumptions and sometimes to describe sets of programs. The context will make our speci c usage clear.
Regression biases impose a general-to-speci c ordering over the space S of all safe RTS techniques. Each
safe RTS technique relies on a bias that partitions the space P of programs and test suites into programs
and test suites to which the bias applies, and programs and test suites to which it does not. Given that, we
can de ne a metric for regression biases that measures the extent of the space P covered by the bias.
Using this general-to-speci c metric, we can structure the space S of safe RTS techniques with an ordering
R over techniques. In a directed graph of ordering R, safe RTS technique A has a directed edge to safe RTS
0

0

0
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Figure 1: (a) The space of all possible programs, with domains of safety for RTS techniques A, B, and C
imposed. (b) The space of all possible safe RTS techniques, with general-to-speci c ordering among A, B,
and C imposed.
technique B if the regression bias of B contains the regression bias of A (in other words, all programs in B 's
partition belong to A's partition). With this ordering, we can characterize the relative strengths of di erent
techniques over the total space of programs by examining the extents of the techniques' underlying biases.
Figure 1 illustrates this notion. The safe RTS techniques A, B , and C represented in the gure are
techniques in the space S of all safe RTS techniques. On the left in the gure, the space P of all possible
programs is shown, with RTS techniques A, B , and C shown as subsets over this space; this illustrates the
sets of programs over which the regression biases for these techniques apply. On the right in the gure, the
space S of safe RTS techniques is shown, with the general-to-speci c ordering among A, B , and C imposed.
The gure shows that A is more general than B , and that C is more general than B , but that neither A nor
C is more general than the other, even though the subsets of P for which the two are safe overlap.
The most general regression biases under this general-to-speci c ordering always hold, and thus always
allow their corresponding techniques to produce safe subsets. The bias underlying the retest-all approach
is one instance of this most general bias: the null-restriction bias. The null-restriction bias is by de nition
true for all programs. Since the retest-all approach selects all tests all of the time, it is guaranteed to always
be 100% inclusive for all programs.
The most speci c regression biases | which we term null-selection biases | hold only when no changes
have been made to the code, the environment is held perfectly constant, and P is correct for T . Algorithms
based on such a bias would always select an empty set of test cases for reexecution. Cost-e ective safe RTS
techniques must utilize biases that lie somewhere in between the null-restriction and null-selection biases.
While this ordering has theoretical usefulness, care should be taken in applying it. The bias underlying
a technique might rank high in the general-to-speci c ordering, but application of the technique might be
impractical. Or, a bias might apply to a wide class of programs, but it might fail to apply to exactly those
programs in which we are interested. Nonetheless, the general-to-speci c ordering does supply one tool for
comparing safe RTS techniques.
8

3.2 State, Semantic Words, and Agent Sets
So far, we have focused on the de nition of safe RTS, rather than the construction of proofs of safety.
No proof can proceed, however, without a model of the program and computing environment under test.
Because no one model is ideal for all techniques, we present the primitive entities out of which a model
and proof speci c to a technique can be built. Later in this paper, we present two general models based on
these primitives | one based on nite automata, the other on a partitioning process over the intersection of
program graphs. These two models are intended to be general, and thus applicable to many di erent speci c
models of computation; the primitives we present now, however, are applicable under various models.
Because the framework developed in this section characterizes safe RTS techniques in general, and because analyses of safety involve diverse factors including peripheral devices and other external agents in the
computing environment, the following de nitions are quite abstract. As we shall show later, to utilize these
de nitions in assessing a speci c safe RTS technique, it is necessary to precisely tailor the de nitions in
terms of the technique's computational model: such precision is critical for exacting a speci cation of the
technique's regression bias.
We begin by de ning \state":

De nition 10. State S : The complete speci cation of the internal parameters of the compu-

tational model adopted for the program and computing environment in question at time t.

Normally when we think of \state" we think of the contents of memory and registers. To completely
characterize state for our purposes, however, we might also need to include the interfaces between the
computer and external universe.5 In essence, the state should subsume all signi cant factors internal to the
model of the computer, where signi cance depends on the assumptions of the regression bias. For instance,
most testers assume that the transient voltages in gates during a state transition are insigni cant and only
the stable value matters; there might, however, be an RTS technique that requires the state to model this
transition. Everything not included in the state should be either constant or inconsequential for all runs of
test cases. Nonvolatile storage on hard disks, for instance, is generally viewed as external to the computing
device. As such, we expect this external object to satisfy the quality of being consistent for each test case,
thus allowing us to ignore it. When the hard disk is not suciently consistent given the subject domain, we
must incorporate the disk into the computational model or rerun all test cases for which this inconsistency
is an issue. For instance, a test case consisting of two concurrent distributed transactions might not be able
to ignore the state of the hard disk, particularly if the transactions are required to be atomic.
Of course, only part of the state might be pertinent to proving particular test cases fault-behavioral
equivalent. In particular, there can exist dynamically changing portions of the state S that can have no
e ect on the output behavior of a test case according to the regression bias and given the program P under
test. We shall thus divide the state S into two domains, X and S ? X , where X denotes the transient state.

De nition 11. Transient State X: The subset of the state S that, for a particular test case t
run on P , can be arbitrarily changed without causing P to exhibit di erent output behaviors.

Existing safe RTS techniques tend to view the computing device as an interpreter for a particular language. Safe RTS
techniques requiring stricter control, however, might require that the tester account for hardware interactions. In fact, some
techniques might view the \computing device" as a worldwide computer network, with all of the complexity involved in
communication now a fundamental part of the state.
5
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X can be a dicult domain to specify. X usually varies over time; for instance, if the stack and heap
are viewed as part of the state, program variables in these regions eventually become dead and join X .
Nonetheless, if a safe RTS technique can show that the execution of P on test case t di ers from the
execution of P on t only in X , we know that P and P are fault-behavioral equivalent on t. For example, if
the only changes between P and P consist of changes to variables that are never referenced, then all of the
changes that form P involve X . Further, specifying X is not always dicult; in Section 5.3, we construct a
new safe RTS technique for which substantial portions of X are easily speci ed.
0

0

0

0

Our model must also include dynamic primitives that operate on the static primitives constituting the
state; however, the model must account for the fact that the dynamic primitives that we think the code
exempli es might di er from the dynamic primitives that the code combined with the computing environment
actually generate. For example, suppose we are testing a system that transparently implements remote
procedure calls. As testers, we might expect that a remote procedure call would return in bounded time,
particularly if the testing process was designed for a centralized system instead of a distributed one, but
in other computing environments this might not be the case (usually long delays would result in an error
condition on the remote procedure call, but some systems might not implement this protocol) [12]. Our
problem, of course, was that our expectations for the behavior of the dynamic primitive were subtly incorrect.
Further, if our description of the dynamic primitives does not encompass all potential dynamic e ects, it
might be that even if we had the correct dynamic primitive, other unexpected behaviors might occur. For
example, if we do not incorporate other processes concurrently executing on the computer into the state S ,
and if real-time constraints exist, a round-robin scheduled system cannot be suciently speci ed. An RTS
technique based on this insucient foundation might indicate that a test case need not be re-run when, in
fact, running such a test case could reveal a real-time error. Speci cations need not only be correct for the
domain in question, but they must also encompass all relevant factors. In past work, the roles played by
the di erent components of dynamic primitives have not been explored: this has made proofs more dicult
than necessary, as well as hindering the development of a common language for safe RTS techniques.
We thus divide dynamic primitives into three domains: semantic words, valid agents, and rogue agents.
An action on the state requires either a rogue agent to act, or a semantic word to bind with a valid or rogue
agent.

De nition 12. Semantic Word: A semantic word  is the semantic entity representing a set
of expected program behaviors, de ned in terms of a speci c computational model M (which is
subject to and an inherent part of the regression bias R).
De nition 13. Agent: The set of all dynamic e ectors that either enact semantic words or
enact other behaviors potentially not speci ed by the program.

De nition 14. Valid Agent Set: The set of all agents  that transform the expected abstract
behaviors of semantic words into real behavior of a physical machine M . Valid agents by de nition
are those that uphold the regression bias R.

De nition 15. Rogue Agent Set: The set of all agents : that either generate actions without

binding to a semantic word, or generate inappropriate actions on M given the speci cations of
. Rogue agents by de nition create behavior that is not consistent with the regression bias R.
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The composition of an agent set with respect to a speci c safe RTS technique depends on the way in which
the computing environment has been abstracted for that technique. In the case where safe RTS techniques
operate on high-level language constructs, the agent set will account for the compiler, the assembler, the
underlying hardware and operating system, and potentially other programs executing at the same time. All
agents that do not satisfy the expectations of the overarching abstraction assumed by the safe RTS technique
pose hazards to the safety of that technique. Also, agents do not necessarily operate at the moment of a
program's binding. For example, a compiler transforms a high-level-language statement into a set of assembly
instructions, which are then translated into machine language. If this high level language is the level at which
a particular safe RTS technique operates, then the compiler itself is a component of the agent set with which
a semantic word binds, even though the action of the compiler occurs before the word is executed.
The presentations of existing safe RTS techniques have not included explicit discussions of the nature of
the semantic word set or the associated agent sets assumed by the technique, although all have made implicit
assumptions about these sets. For instance, as we shall discuss in Section 5, DejaVu and Pythia posit that
single statements or blocks of code constitute individual dynamic primitives. As currently designed, these
techniques depend on deterministic control- ow-ordered code execution for safety. Of course, safe RTS
techniques need not be restricted to the regression biases underlying existing safe RTS techniques. Later,
in Section 5.3, we shall discuss a safe RTS technique for spreadsheet languages that does not depend on
deterministic, control- ow ordered execution of code, although the outputs of programs in the languages are
deterministic. Other techniques might not even require deterministic outputs, as long as certain deterministic
constraints on output behavior are met (a random number generator, for example, must produce seemingly
non-deterministic output behavior to be correct).

3.3 Iterative Behavioral Equivalence
In general, the problem of proving two programs fault-behavioral equivalent for an arbitrary test case t is
undecidable (trivially Turing reducible to HALT). Thus, safe RTS techniques restrict their attention to a
decidable approximation of fault-behavioral equivalence. This approximation must be safe, but it need not
be 100% precise.
Given the preceding de nitions, we can de ne the decidable problem of establishing iterative behavioral
equivalence ; this notion will be crucial to the semantic framework. First, however, we need a de nition of
an execution trace | one that is more general than the standard control- ow-based de nition.

De nition 16. Execution Trace: An execution trace records a partially or totally ordered set

of semantic words representing the execution of a test case t on P .

This de nition does not mention safety; safe RTS techniques require execution traces that can support
inferences about fault-behavioral equivalence. A trace methodology supports such inferences if it makes it
possible to correctly infer, from looking at two orderings of semantic words representing the execution of test
case t on P and P , that P and P are fault-behavioral equivalent on t. As we discuss later, this requires
that the semantic word set satisfy the regression bias for the RTS technique and that the dynamic properties
of the programs to which the technique is applied conform to the regression bias.
For most existing safe RTS techniques, an execution trace represents a sequential record of either code
statements, basic blocks, or functions executed by a test case, and is assumed to represent a deterministic
0
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execution path through the program. Approximated traces, which are commonly used, need not be in
execution order, but if combined with the program P should parameterize a set of execution paths. In
general, however, traces for safe RTS techniques need not be restricted to paths. For instance, a safe
RTS technique that converts programs into hierarchical plan representations might use execution trees or
execution DAGs, where the children of a parent node can occur in any order as long as they all precede the
achievement of the parent goal. Whereas two \path" execution traces are identical only when the traces are
exact copies, two DAG execution traces are equivalent whenever one of the DAGs can be reordered subject
to the partial order and thereby become identical to the DAG that was not reordered.
We can now de ne iterative behavioral equivalence:

De nition 17. Iterative Behavioral Equivalence: Two nite-length execution traces ET

and ET for test case t on programs P and P are said to be iterative behavioral equivalent if and
only if ET and ET contain equivalent (totally or partially) ordered strings of semantic words.
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0

Iterative-behavioral equivalence imposes stricter requirements for equivalence than does fault-behavioral
equivalence. In fact, iterative behavioral equivalence is similar to the all-essential assumption of Leung and
White[19]; that assumption asserts that every semantic word in an execution trace can a ect the overall
path computation. If the abstract behaviors of semantic word set  actually map correctly by  to their
corresponding behaviors on real hardware, then iterative behavioral equivalence proves that the piecewise
computations of P and P over test case t remain identical, which in turn guarantees that the nal result of
the computation is identical.
Note that this de nition speci es that execution traces be of nite length, a reasonable assumption given
that in practice, any test run must eventually terminate (through either normal program termination or
forced termination by the tester). However, some testing processes might create excessively large execution
traces, particularly when test cases require long run times: such traces might as well be in nite since we
cannot store them. A common solution to this dilemma discards some information from the trace as it
is generated | for example, by keeping a bit vector that records whether each semantic word was or was
not executed [26]. This culling of information may lead to false judgements of inequivalence, but these
judgements can be restricted to conservative judgements that preserve safety.
Clearly, the problem of determining fault-behavioral equivalence is similar to the Post-Correspondence
Problem [16] and can be the target of a reduction from the Halting problem. On the other hand, the
problem of determining iterative behavioral equivalence is decidable, provided that execution traces are
nite: in totally ordered traces, two traces either converge at the next step or they do not, and in partially
ordered traces, traces can be reordered to show that one of the equivalent orderings under the partial order
converges at each step, or that no such reordering is possible. In fact, we can propose a simple solution to
the iterative behavioral equivalence problem based on deterministic nite automata.
To specify this solution, we rst consider how to model a technique derived directly from De nition
17. Since iterative behavioral equivalent traces are identical semantic-word for semantic-word (potentially
after some reordering if the traces are partial orders), we know that a process of iterating through pairs of
words from start to nish will be able to recognize iterative behavioral equivalence. A deterministic nite
automaton for safe RTS that directly re ects the de nition is inecient, but subsumes all other techniques
for determining iterative behavioral equivalence.
0
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We rst create traces for both P and P ; this obviates the need for safe RTS since we want to avoid
running the test case on P , but in this over-arching method, this redundancy provides a bound on the
precision of iterative behavioral equivalence techniques. We then create automata M and M for the traces
 on P and  on P , respectively. As we stated previously, these traces are composed of semantic words.
We design the automata M corresponding to the trace  to accept only the language composed of traces
that are equivalent to  given the partial order. Thus, in a totally ordered technique, only the trace itself
is accepted; in a partially ordered technique, we must create a machine that accepts all traces equivalent
under the partial order. As we've stated, a trace is equivalent under the partial order if its members can be
permuted to create an exact duplicate of the other trace such that no permutation violates the partial order.
Such a machine can be exponentially large in the size of the trace, but we are not focusing on eciency yet:
we only wish to show that such a machine is possible.
We then designate L and L as the languages accepted by M and M , respectively. We know, then, that
there is a simple technique for proving equivalence in regular languages: we simply compute the language
L = (L \ L ) [ (L \ L ). Clearly, M accepts the same language as M only if L is empty [16]. Obviously,
this rst approach is not the approach one would choose to implement; nonetheless, all safe RTS techniques
based on iterative behavioral equivalence attempt to eciently approximate the solution produced by this
inecient technique. More signi cantly, this technique and its second formulation provide the foundation
for the ecient generalized safe RTS technique presented in Section 4.
The necessity of obtaining traces for P is the primary downfall of the rst nite automaton formulation.
We thus present a second formulation of the nite automaton method, SafeDFA, which, while also not
ecient, operates in a manner similar to that of practical safe RTS techniques. First, SafeDFA requires
that we convert P and P into graph representations | we will not be using P 's graph, but the trace  for
P must correspond to an appropriate sequence of nodes under the partial order. Later, in Section 4, we
discuss the constraints that these graphs must satisfy to support safe RTS. For the moment, we state only
that these graphs must re ect a precedence ordering on the semantic words contained in P and P . This
ordering could be total, as it would if the semantic word set and its associated abstractions depended on
control- ow order, or it could be partial, as it would if (for example) the ordering re ected only control and
data dependencies. The key advantage of this formulation is that SafeDFA can use the graphs to determine
(i) whether a test case would de nitely create equivalent traces on P and P , or (ii) whether no iterative
behavioral equivalence algorithm can determine this given the limitations of the bias, the trace and graph
construction functions, and the lack of a trace for P .
First, SafeDFA requires that we transform the trace for P into a nite automaton just as we did for the
rst nite automaton. For a deterministic path-like trace, this results in a deterministic nite automaton
with one state for each semantic word in the trace, where each state has at most one outgoing state transition:
the transition from the state to its successor on receiving the successor label. Partially ordered traces require
more than one state for each word in the trace. In particular, the automata must include state sequences for
every possible sequence of node executions subject to the partial order. Note that this is exactly the same
process used to construct M in the rst nite automata method.
Next, we create a nite automaton corresponding to the graph representation of P . This graph representation automaton contains a state for every semantic word used in the abstracted program (one state for
each occurence of a semantic word). The automaton built out of these states must contain transitions such
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that all traces for P are accepted by the automaton | remember that both traces and graph are built out
of the same semantic word set. The edges in the graph automaton are labelled by their destination state.
The automaton might also accept traces that cannot semantically occur; for example, the machine might
accept a trace that takes a branch that cannot be taken in the program, perhaps because the condition on
the branch is always true. This is perfectly acceptable. The iterative behavioral equivalence process that
we will describe will reject any trace that passes through code rendered inert as a result of changes to P to
create P : traces that cannot result from the execution of P but that are accepted by P 's graph automaton
must fail to occur as traces for P . Thus, we will never compare a graph automaton with a trace for P such
that P 's graph automaton accepts the trace, but the trace cannot semantically occur in P .
As a simple example of a graph representation for P , we might create a nite automaton that corresponds
to a control ow graph (CFG), except that the edges are labeled by their destinations, rather than by the
conditions that lead to that edge being taken, as is the normal convention. The start state of this automaton
corresponds to the standard null Start node often added to CFGs. The accepting state corresponds to the
null Exit node appended to the end of the CFG. Of course, control- ow graphs are only one example and
apply only to one subset of programs. Nonetheless, the core idea holds: the graph formulation must capture
the ordered behavior of the program as exempli ed by traces.
We now consider the way in which the trace and graph automata are combined to determine whether
the test case responsible for the trace must be re-executed. First, consider the simple case in which semantic
words in P 's trace necessarily imply their successor edge, no matter what other edges exit the node corresponding to the word (ie, the evaluation of semantic word leads to an edge speci ed by the value generated
by the semantic word, and no two edges with that same condition exist). Given such a constraint, we need
only determine whether the language accepted by the trace's DFA is accepted by P 's graph automaton.
In many situations, the requirement that semantic words imply their successor holds. After all, semantic
words characterize the behavior of program constructs: in many cases they also characterize the transitions.
On the other hand, language designers often give semantic words default successors, which must then be
modeled in the graph representation. For instance, in one graphical model of C-style switch statements,
a single node might correspond to the switch condition, with edges corresponding to the particular cases.
These particular cases are edges where the edge taken is speci ed by the switch condition. However, if the
particular case evaluated by the switch does not exist, then a default edge is taken: this edge corresponds
either to a default statement or to a natural exit of the switch. Whether this default edge is taken
necessarily depends on what case statements exist in the switch. In a particular program, giving a word a
default successor has a well-de ned behavior: if the semantic word's alteration to the state does not result in
taking one of the labeled edges, take the default edge. When comparing programs, however, default behavior
can undermine iterative behavioral equivalence. In particular, suppose that the graph representations for
P and P contain only one di erence: one node in P has an exiting edge that the corresponding node in
P does not have. Further, both nodes have default edges. In this case, a trace that was valid for P , but
which takes the default edge in P in the node corresponding to the changed node in P , can no longer be
proven equivalent on P and P given the techniques presented in this paper. At the same time, however, if
the trace does not take the default edge, then the trace is equivalent on those P and P . There are only a
small set of possible default situations that can arise, so we can use a simple algorithm and then, if we run
into a problematic node, consider the set of possible situations and select on that basis.
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While the foregoing automaton does not provide a mathematical upper bound on the precision of iterative behavioral equivalence techniques (that bound being given by the rst formulation), it does provide a
pragmatic upper bound for decidable safe RTS techniques. The automaton will fail to be as precise as the
rst automaton only when the threat of default behavior produces imprecision (given that both formulations
are dependent on the same regression bias). Since real safe RTS techniques cannot have access to traces for
P either, they too must necessarily accept a certain level of imprecision due to default behaviors.
The validity of the two preceding formulations relies on the existence of a machine E that can tell us
when two semantic words in P and P are equivalent. Of course, since semantic words can themselves be
smaller-scale programs, the problem of determining whether two words are equivalent or nonequivalent is
undecidable; whenever ambiguity exists, the machine must assume the words are nonequivalent. Fortunately,
safety requires only that the machine E tell us the two words are equivalent only if the machine can guarantee
that equivalence.
0

0

3.4 The Stable Semantics Condition and Equivalence Machines
The nite automata methods that we have just discussed prove that a test case can be excluded from
regression testing on the basis of its trace given that the semantic words fully determine program behavior.
However, semantic words only fully determine actual behavior if all changes to the state result from the
binding of semantic words  with valid agents . Further, the validity of the nite automata methods depends
on the existence of the equivalence machine E : safety requires that this machine output an \equivalent"
response only when the semantic words always are equivalent when the regression bias is satis ed. The
validity of the equivalence machine (and the entire nite automata formulation) is predicated on the premise
that the semantic word set satis es the Stable Semantics Condition, which we will de ne shortly.
At every point before a semantic word  is executed on the state S , a set of properties p holds. These
properties describe the state S at that point. By p, however, we do not mean exactly the same thing as
the state S . The state is a static quality of a machine, whereas we use p as a stronger quality that entails
that fpg ^ fqg.6 Basically, the notation fpgf (S )fqg describes a speci cation: if the property p holds and
transformation  ^  acts on S , then q will hold on completion of f . We have strengthened this de nition
somewhat to suggest that p being true implies that f terminates. The set of properties p implies that the
action performed by  ^  terminates and leaves the machine in a state that satis es property q. Thus, a
truth value for p implies that the system performs transformation  ^  according to the proper speci cation.
The fact that property q is satis ed on completion of  ^  implies that a subsequent action-pair subject
to property q being true can also satisfy a subsequent set of properties on completion, and so on for the
length of the program. The set of behaviors of the form fpi gi ^ fpi+1 g form an alphabet  of actionpairs. Essentially, this alphabet contains the original alphabet (semantic word set)  conjoined with a valid
regression bias: if the bias holds, then the elements of  bind with the correct agents, thus generating .
However, when the regression bias does not hold, rogue agents can compromise safety, invalidating nite
automata methods built on the basis of that bias. Safe RTS algorithms such as SafeDFA (and programmers
in general) manipulate only the semantic word set . When these words bind with rogue agents, unsafe
situations can occur. As an example, our regression bias might include the assumption that all program
statements eventually terminate. On this basis, we might construct a safe RTS algorithm that relies on
6

Our notation is derived from Reference [1].
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program statements deterministically terminating. Suppose an algorithm based on this bias operates on
the initial and modi ed versions of a program P and selects no test cases. But suppose that P contains a
send statement, and that in the language used for P , send statements block. If we have not forced the
external environment to be rigidly constant when testing P , the receiver of that send statement might never
return a response, and thus the program might perpetually block. This potential nondeterministic behavior
undermines our regression bias and thereby allows fault-revealing test cases to slip past the algorithm. In
terms of our de nitions, this occurs because  bound with :, generating a di erent program behavior than
expected; thus, safety is lost. The key hazard is that the test suite might not, in fact, be DFR for P if the
environment is not held constant.
In designing the semantic alphabet , which models the actions of the program and environment, one
must completely specify the behavior of every construct in the language, including all possible ways in which
the command might interact with environmental factors. If such speci cations cannot be made inclusively,
then a safe RTS algorithm must view that word as always dangerous.
If a semantic word has a complete and correct speci cation over the programs and test suites in the bias,
then we say that the semantic word satis es the Stable Semantics Condition (SSC).
Formally, the action-pair  ^ , subject to property p, corresponds to a function U (S ) 7! S , which causes
q to be satis ed on completion. The selected function U (S ) is subject to two constraints:
1. U (S ) is one-to-one or many-to-one (injective or deterministic, respectively).
2. and either : = ; or : acts only on the transient state X.
We shall say that the satisfaction of these constraints for the semantic words  implies that the SSC holds
for symbols in the alphabet .
An alphabet  in which all words satisfy the SSC is necessary but not sucient for safe RTS. In particular,
the SSC considers behavior only during the action of the word; it does not consider the possibility of rogue
agents generating transformations on the state independently of the executing semantic words. Safe RTS
can occur only when we have an alphabet satisfying the SSC and we can show that rogue agents will not
spontaneously transform the state independently of semantic word execution; if the SSC is satis ed, only
valid agents can bind with semantic words, so the rogue agent set is null, provided that rogue agents cannot
spontaneously occur. The equivalence machine we describe next is dependent only on the SSC; the machine
of which it is a part, however, depends on both the SSC and the absence of non-binding rogue agents.
Given a semantic alphabet  in which all words satisfy the SSC, an equivalence machine E must take
a word from each of two execution traces constructed on  and determine whether they are equivalent. A
perfect equivalence machine could precisely determine such equivalence, and thus could represent equivalence
by outputting a 1 if the two words are equivalent and a 0 if not. For nite programming languages, it is
possible that such a machine could exist; this would require one to enumerate every possible syntactic
structure and know which structures are provably equivalent to each other. In general, however, and for
in nite languages in particular, no such perfect machine can exist. However, a machine E can still be made
safe on an in nite language if we weaken the claims it must make. Essentially, we allow E to output 1 if it
is absolutely sure two words are equivalent, but otherwise output 0. This is safe, as outputting a zero will
merely force tests to be selected that possibly could have been omitted.
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To make an equivalence machine's job possible, we must label the symbols in  with handles that the
machine can recognize. These can be simply the lexical name of a programming language construct if that
is the model used, or in the case in which semantic words do not correspond directly to constructs in the
programming language, we might provide some other simple handle.
Altogether, this material gives rise to the following theorem.

Theorem 1. Let  be an alphabet and let R be a regression bias. If the stable semantics
condition holds for  and at least some  2  can be deterministically recognized, then an equiv-

alence machine E can be constructed such that E never judges two semantic words equivalent
incorrectly as long as R holds.

The proof of the theorem follows immediately from the preceding discussion of the machine's construction.

4 A Generalized Safe Regression Algorithm
The primary problem with SafeDFA is that it must create an automaton for the entire trace of each test case
and then analyze that entire trace against P 's automaton. Traces can be arbitrarily large in the size of the
program, so such a technique is inecient. To generate an ecient technique another approach is needed.
Key to the design of an ecient algorithm is the realization that it is the di erences between P and P
that cause test case behaviors to diverge. SafeDFA focused on the traces themselves; however, we can deduce
the test cases that might diverge by rst analyzing the program and extracting information that allows us
to eciently select test cases. Many such analyses have worst case costs that are polynomial in the size of
the programs. Thus, if we create safe approximations to the traces that are also polynomial in the size of
the program, we can generate a technique that is ecient. This is the fundamental goal of the SafeSpace
algorithm presented in this section. SafeSpace accepts that a certain level of imprecision is unavoidable
if the full traces are not going to be examined, and thus SafeSpace employs a potentially imprecise but
ecient approach. Later, we will discuss an extension to SafeSpace that is as precise as SafeDFA and
requires polynomial time to analyze the graphs for P and P , but requires time polynomial in the length of
the full traces to achieve maximally precise test selection.
Figure 2 presents the SafeSpace algorithm. This algorithm constructs abstract graph representations
of P and P based on the semantic word set , and then traverses these representations in a depth- rst
manner, constructing a signature graph Gsig that represents the \footprint" of P on P : the domain of code
over which both programs can be proven iterative behavioral equivalent.7
As we shall demonstrate, SafeSpace serves as the basis for the construction of iterative behavioral
equivalence algorithms, and acts as a template for the generation of new safe RTS algorithms, by providing a
skeleton that can be eshed out with details speci c to a particular safe RTS problem. As such, SafeSpace
can be used to abstract behavior and provide safe RTS techniques applicable in program domains that existing
techniques have not addressed (declarative visual programs for example). As we shall also demonstrate,
SafeSpace can be used as the basis for proofs of safety of existing methods.
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7 This approach is similar to the nite automata based approach used in the safe RTS algorithms developed by Ball [5], but
Ball's approach was developed for control- ow based algorithms whereas our approach is general enough to encompass a wider
range of iterative behavior equivalence techniques.
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proc
SafeSpace
input: programs P and P
output: intersection graph Gsig with edges from structure to the select node.
1. begin:
0

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

construct graphs G and G by executing  and  functions on P and P .
add start nodes S and S to G and G and edges from the start nodes
to all the roots of the trees of G and G .
add Select node to empty graph Gsig .
add S to Gsig .
Compare( S , S , null )
return Gsig
0

0

0

0

0

0

end:

proc Compare
input: two nodes N , N , and an edge (X; N )
10. begin:
11.
match-edges-out-of( N , N )
12.
if an edge (N ; C ) lacks a corresponding edge (N; C ) in G
13.
redirect edge (X; N ) to Select Node in Gsig (if edge is null, all test cases must be rerun)
14.
else
0

0

0

0

15.
mark N \N -visited"
16.
for each edge e out of N not matching one out of N
17.
add edge from node N in Gsig to Select node
18.
for each matching edge ( N , V ) ( N , V )
19.
if ( V , V ) is false
20.
add edge from N in Gsig to Select node
21.
else if V is marked V visited
22.
continue
23.
else if V is marked X -visited, where X 6= V but  (X ,V ) is true
24.
Reentrant Trace Solution()
25.
else add node V and edge (N; V ) to Gsig
26.
Compare(V; V ; (N;V))
27.
endif
28.
endfor
29.
endif
30. end:
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Figure 2: Generalized Safe RTS Algorithm
The following sections present details on SafeSpace. The next section de nes paired traversals, which
underly the algorithm's overall function and correctness. Section 4.2 describes the graph structure used
by the algorithm, and the  and  functions used to create that structure. Section 4.3 describes details of
the graph-walk portion of the algorithm that is encoded in the Compare procedure. Section 4.4 describes
extensions to the algorithm that increase its precision.

4.1 Paired Traversals
As we have indicated, SafeSpace is based on the idea that no ecient, safe RTS technique can operate
directly on traces. Instead, SafeSpace operates on graph representations of programs P and P , producing
a signature graph of size polynomial in the sizes of the programs. The correctness of this process is predicated
on the idea of paired traversals.
A paired traversal is a pair of sequences of nodes ( , ) created by a simultaneous walk through graphs G
and G corresponding to P and P . Theorem 2 shows that a paired traversal that has been proven equivalent
(i.e., whose constituent sequences have been proven equivalent) inductively up to nodes N and N and then
shown equivalent at N and N continues to be equivalent after N and N . Note that, similar to our de nition
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of iterative behavioral equivalence in Section 3.3, paired traversals can contain sequences equivalent under a
partial order as well as a total order; in the case of partial orders, however, our inductive proof switches to
equivalence not at individual nodes, but to equivalence at the completion of sets equivalent under the partial
order. (This is also equivalent to node-by-node equivalence after reordering.) Theorem 2 is signi cant in that
it justi es the subsequent corollary (Corollary 1), which states that all paired traversals proven equivalent
up to N and N remain equivalent after N and N if N and N are proven equivalent. This corollary justi es
the approximation inherent in SafeSpace: the footprint Gsig of P on P , or the safe space as we shall later
de ne it, acts as a proxy for all traces that execute on semantic words only in its domain.
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Theorem 2. Given a paired traversal ( , ) induced by test case t on graphs G and G , if a node
0

0

N in G and a corresponding node N in G (as de ned by the machines M and E ) can be shown
equivalent under the partial order implicit in the trace for t by a function  that is equivalent to
E while the stable semantics condition holds, then  and  will converge to identical states and
satisfy identical properties q after the actions of N and N .
0
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0

0

Proof: We rst consider the case of totally ordered traces. If the stable semantics condition
holds for all symbols in  occurring in the traces, if the rogue agent set is empty, and if the
initial set of properties p can be guaranteed to be equivalent at the start of both traversals, then
we know that the transformations on the state engendered by both traces are identical at each
step. Thus, the paired traversals de ned by the totally ordered traces converge at each step in
the trace for both P and P .
Partially ordered traces, on the other hand, do not need to converge at each step. However,
the de nition of the partial order imposes strict requirements that allow iterative behavioral
equivalence. In essence, if the traces are equivalent, then one trace can be reordered without
violating the partial order, such that we can then perform an equivalence test identical to the total
order test and thereby prove equivalence. On the other hand, if the traces are not equivalent, no
such permutation exists. As the simulated totally ordered traversal is identical behaviorally to all
other permutations allowed, the two traces are in the same family and thus iterative behavioral
equivalent. 2
0

Note that the reconvergence of partially ordered traces is not the same as the general problem of reconvergence, which we eschewed earlier in Section 3 as undecidable. The general problem allows the violation
of the partial order: proving equivalence for the general problem requires a tractable solution to the Post
Correspondence Problem.

Corollary 1. If N and N can be proven equivalent, then all paired traversals on G and G that
0

0

are equivalent up to and through N and N are also equivalent after N and N .
0

0

In essence, this corollary allows us to focus on the graphs and prove equivalence over G and G of sets of
traces rather than just a single trace. All traces passing through N after N and N are proven equivalent
remain equivalent over G and G if they were equivalent up to those nodes. The process of establishing
paired traversals by simultaneously walking G and G constructs a graph that is isomorphic to subgraphs of
0

0

0

0
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both G and G . We call this graph the signature graph Gsig of P and P , and we call the program space
represented by this graph the safe space.
Due to Corollary 1, signature graphs serve as proofs that all test cases whose traces remain entirely
within Gsig need not be re-executed. Further, we need not directly \map a test trace onto" this \safe space"
to prove that the trace remains entirely within the signature graph. A cutset of edges in G separates the
subgraph in G corresponding to the signature graph Gsig from the rest of G. We can record this cutset and
use it to determine whether a test case needs to be re-executed. If the trace starts in Gsig and does not
contain any edge in the cutset, then we know that the test case corresponding to that trace need not be
re-executed. This represents a substantial savings in time: the constraints of the problem allow this subgraph
isomorphism to be accomplished in low-order polynomial time, and allow the safe approximation of traces
by edges only. Further, experiments with existing techniques suggest that in practice this approximation
provides results as precise as non-approximated techniques [26].
0

0

4.2 Constructing Graph Representations: The  and  functions
The rst step of the generalized algorithm SafeSpace presented in Figure 2 is to transform the program
into elements of semantic alphabet  and then order those elements into a graph structure. These two tasks
are performed by the  and  functions, respectively. The  function takes the raw program (including code,
speci cations of environmental behavior, and so on, as discussed in Section 3) and explicitly converts that
data into a set of instances of semantic words, as speci ed by the requirements of the regression bias. The 
function orders the set of semantic words into a graph structure, again according to the requirements of the
particular safe RTS technique.
The choice of  and  functions is critical to the eciency of the algorithm. The  and  functions not
only de ne the size of the graph representations, which in turn a ects the execution time and memory space
utilized, but they also determine the  function used (which implements the equivalence machine E ), since
the  function operates on pairs of semantics words just as the equivalence machine E did in SafeDFA.
The designers of  and  functions must consider whether these functions, as well as the the semantic
alphabet  and regression bias R, together suce for safety. For example, suppose a semantic alphabet
designer decided that there would be one semantic word designating all interprocess communications. For
some applications this might suce; other applications, however, might use both blocking and non-blocking
send/receive protocols. Clearly, changing the protocol can result in di erent behavior, which is not considered
by this semantic alphabet. Similarly, a designer must ensure that the function  actually represents all
precedence orderings in which one is interested. For example, as we discussed earlier, a partial order might
not be suciently strong. In the end, the  and  functions must ensure that the Stable Semantics Condition
(SSC) holds for the chosen alphabet for all programs covered by the regression bias, or ensure that if the
SSC can fail, failure is detectable.
As an example, consider the simple branching construct illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3-a contains a
simple C-style if/else statement; the graph in 3-b illustrates one possible representation of this code. In this
case, the  and  functions create a single decision node with three branch edges leading to successor nodes.
The if, else if and else components of the code are absorbed into one node in this representation. For
large and dense if/else statements, such a representation may re ect the branch tables generated in assembly
code for the statements [3]. For sparse branch statements, the representation may not re ect the code
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1
1. if (a == 1)
2. c = 1;
3. else if (a == 2)
4. c = 3;
5. else
6. c = 5;

a)

a=1

1
a=1

2

default
a=2

4

default

2

3

6

b)

a=2

default

4

6

c)

Figure 3: Two graph constructions for a C if/else statement.
generated; Figure 3-c presents a representation re ecting the cascading branch code that might be generated
for sparse branch statements.
For many safe RTS techniques, the particular choice of representation in this case is irrelevant; for others,
however, the choice may be signi cant. Suppose, for example, that we are modeling a real-time system in
which the compiler constructs a branch table. Perhaps to maintain response time we required the speed of
the branch table on large and dense switch statements. The semantic word set used in the graph structure
inherently accounts for maximum response times given inputs, but it assigns a particularly low value for the
decision node as it assumes an ecient branch representation. If our compiler, actually produces a cascading
branch sequence, our speci cation for the if/else statement is incorrect, and safety may be violated. Of
course, for non real-time systems, the interpretation of the large if/else may be irrelevant. Whatever choice
we make is informed by our subject domain and transforms our regression bias.
In Section 5, we consider several safe RTS algorithms, that use various  and  functions, and we specify
the conditions under which each can operate safely.

4.3 Finding the Safe Space
We next consider the graph-walk portion of the algorithm of Figure 2, encoded in the Compare procedure.
This aspect of the algorithm is derived from standard depth- rst search algorithms, thus making it structurally similar to DejaVu and Ball's algorithms [5, 26].
The algorithm acts by extending the safe space Gsig . When SafeSpace cannot prove that a pair of
edges in G and G lead to a pair of nodes (N; N ) that are equivalent under , the algorithm changes the
destination of the edge to a \Select" node. Any test case whose trace for P cannot be mapped onto Gsig
without encountering the Select node must be re-executed. Otherwise, SafeSpace has proven that as long
as the regression bias holds, the test case cannot be fault revealing.
Note that the algorithm also adds an edge from a node N to the Select node if the number of edges
outgoing from N changes. As a simple example, if we used actual code statements as our semantic word
alphabet and control- ow as the  function, adding a new edge outgoing from a node representing a switch
statement (i.e. adding a new switch case) might cause a test case that formerly exercised the default edge
to exercise the new edge. This can occur even if the execution trace for P includes no changed entities.
Also, note the use of the \N -visited" condition. The SafeSpace algorithm does not rst descend to
a pair of nodes and then examine them for equivalence. Instead, it sits at a pair of nodes already proven
equivalent and looks across edges at pairs of successor nodes V and V ; there, it rst checks whether the
0
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0
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successor nodes are equivalent (line 19), and if they are and if V is marked V -visited, it does not proceed
further in its traversal beneath V (lines 21-22). Note that if V is marked X -visited where X 6= V , then
the trace is looping back on itself for the  trace, but is not looping identically back on itself for the 
trace. We call this the reentrant trace problem and discuss it further in Section 4.4. An instantiation of the
SafeSpace algorithm must make a choice for a Reentrant Trace Solution function that acts in this case,
and this choice will a ect the precision and eciency of the resulting RTS technique.
How one copes with reentrant traces depends on the instantiation of the SafeSpace algorithm. Safe RTS
algorithms in practice have dealt with this problem in many di erent manners. The Rothermel/Harrold
algorithm, DejaVu [26], for instance, continues until the safe space is reentered by both traces at equivalent
nodes, or until the technique locates nonequivalent semantic words. In the latter case, DejaVu (e ectively)
directs an edge to the Select node, even though other test cases whose traces are not reentrant might be
associated with that edge. Ball's family of safe RTS algorithms, on the other hand, address the reentry
problem in a sequence of progressively more precise ways that require progressively greater computational
expense. Essentially, these algorithms attempt to store extra information about the reentrant trace and
thereby improve selection on traces [5]. The basic formulation of SafeSpace presented here always selects
test cases on reentering, thus we need not worry about reentrant traces | Gsig is sucient for selection.
Later, we will consider a di erent choice for Reentrant Trace.
Note that it is the re-entry problem that makes the basic formulation of the SafeSpace algorithm less
powerful than SafeDFA. The problem is that if we harvest test cases upon reentering the safe space at
di erent nodes, we might select them for re-execution unnecessarily if it happened that the nodes where
they reentered still guaranteed iterative behavioral equivalence. It is possible that if we tracked their mutual
behavior further, traces might eventually reconverge to a pair of nodes that are equivalent to the same
node in Gsig in such a way that they possessed equivalent states and satis ed identical properties. Then,
they would resume execution as one strand that need not be selected for retest. Since the reentrant trace
scenario has not been observed to occur in practice [26], we have chosen to select upon reentry for our basic
formulation. However, because some techniques might bene t from di erent solutions, and because proof
algorithms often require di erent solutions, we have incorporated the possibility of extension.
After the recursive calls to Compare initiated at line 7 of SafeSpace complete, the algorithm returns
Gsig . Previous safe graph-walk algorithms never explicitly constructed Gsig , instead they returned edges
that attempt to approximate it, or directly selected tests on the basis of those edges. As shown by Ball
for CFGs, this form of edge selection must result in imprecision in the worst case [5]. Constructing Gsig
and returning it eliminates this particular form of edge-selection imprecision at the cost of storing a copy
of Gsig ; as mentioned above, however, the safe space solution can add a di erent source of imprecision.
Below, we provide a solution that does not su er imprecision (although after SafeSpace returns Gsig in that
solution, selecting a maximally precise test suite requires examining the unapproximated trace, which can
be arbitrarily long in the length of the program.
A brief analysis shows that the graph-walk portion of SafeSpace with the basic Reentrant Trace solution
operates in O(jN j + jE j) time, since for identical programs it must check every node and every edge. This
provides, then, a basis for gauging the time that should be spent on  and  functions in the early stages of
the algorithm, since their construction can determine the number of nodes and edges or determine the total
running time if the two functions dwarf the algorithm's run time.
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Figure 4: Example illustrating an occurrence of the reentrant trace problem

4.4 Proving Reentrant Convergent Traces Identical
The SafeSpace algorithm just described is not as precise as SafeDFA. SafeSpace will select test cases whose
execution path reenters nodes in G corresponding to safe space nodes in Gsig but not in G , even if the
sequence of semantic words executed remains the same. As a concrete example, consider graphs G and G
shown in Figure 4. (Start and Exit nodes are omitted from the graphs for simplicity). In these graphs,
identical node labels imply that the semantic words represented by the nodes are identical. By following all
possible traces through G and G one can see that the programs P and P represented by the two graphs
are semantically equivalent. Nonetheless, SafeSpace would prune any test case that takes edge (2,1) in
G, because that edge reenters the safe space, while the corresponding edge for G takes edge (2 ,3 ), thus
continuing on to a node that has not yet been visited (node 3').
However, the semantic word represented by node 3 is identical to the word represented by the node
reached on reentering the safe space (node 1), so up until this point, no divergence in the computation has
occurred. In fact, for these two graphs, no divergence can occur. We de ne the problem of determining
whether semantically identical traces executing divergent paths remain equivalent and reconverge as the
reentrant trace problem.8
Extending SafeSpace to provide greater precision in the presence of reentrant traces is arguably impractical. Any extension to SafeSpace will necessarily create a longer run time as the current method always
stops on reentry; further, new methods can generate new forms of imprecision. At the same time, no practical
cases have been observed in which the reentrant trace problem occurs [24]: all cases examined thus far have
been contrived. Nonetheless, it is possible that cases will be found to exist in practice, and that in some
situations, the cost of test cases may be suciently high to justify even a small possibility of eliminating
one. Further, abstractions other than control ow might result in graphs where reentrant traces are more
common, and in that case, employing a di erent strategy might be useful.
Moreover, in proofs, extensions hold a more central location. As we shall discuss in Section 5, an
instantiation of SafeSpace used in a proof must have a regression bias that is a subset of the regression bias
of the technique being proven safe. If, for example, the technique to be proven safe does not always select on
reentry, then the basic formulation of SafeSpace selects some test cases not selected by the technique under
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8 Reentrant traces are the factor underlying the \pathological" example of a program in which Dejavu is imprecise, given in
[25], although a trace could be reentrant and not result in such a case.
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consideration. But this means that SafeSpace might accidentally possess a larger bias than the technique
under consideration, and thus be proven safe on a set of programs over which the subject technique is
not necessarily safe. In essence, invisible assumptions might slip into the regression bias for SafeSpace,
undermining the entire proof.
There are many possible alternatives for the Reentrant Trace function. Some alternatives might result in
inecient SafeSpace algorithms. In practice, the choice of an extension is based on economic considerations;
in constructing proofs, eciency is irrelevant, and instead the choice should make SafeSpace's regression
bias not only a subset of the bias of the technique being proven safe, but as close a subset as possible.
In this paper, we present only one extension to the SafeSpace algorithm: the Respawning Safe Space
(RSS) Solution. This extension makes the SafeSpace algorithm as precise as the SafeDFA method, while
requiring only O(jN j3 ) time to construct Gsig . However, the test-selection portion of the extension requires
that entire traces be examined. The algorithm also requires a factor of jP j more space than SafeSpace in
the worst case, although examples that result in such behavior are rather contrived. We have chosen to
present this extension because it is potentially useful both in new techniques and in proofs; in particular, we
use the RSS solution in the proof for DejaVu in Section 5.

4.4.1 The Respawning Safe Space Solution
The Respawning Safe Space (RSS) Solution provides an alternative to the original Reentrant Trace solution
presented in the previous sections. The original Reentrant Trace solution selects an edge when it reenters
the safe space; in contrast, the RSS solution continues, \spawning" duplicates of nodes in G.
Below, we present the steps that must be taken when the RSS version of Reentrant Trace is called.
In the following, V is a node in G previously marked \X -visited" for each X 2 fX1; X2 ; : : : Xk g, and V
(V 2= fX1; X2 ; : : : Xk g) is the node in G to which V is being compared. Y is the source node from which
Compare was called. The steps in the algorithm are as follows:
0
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0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1. Duplicate V creating Vdup and add a pointer from Vdup to the base node V . The edge (Y; V ) is
connected to Vdup .
0

2. Mark Vdup \originally V -visited."
0

3. Add a pointer from V to Vdup .
4. Mark Vdup \X -visited" for all X 2 fX1; X2 ; : : : Xk g.
0

0

0

0

0

5. Following pointers, mark V and all nodes previously spawned o of V \V -visited".
0

6. Call Compare on all node pairs reachable from edges exiting V , using Vdup as the source of these edges
(nodes and edges lower in the stack are left as they are).
Figure 5 lets us illustrate this procedure. Proceeding from the Start nodes (omitted for simplicity), the
algorithm reaches nodes 1 and 1 , nds them equivalent, and adds node 1 to Gsig , marking it \originally
1 -visited". Suppose the algorithm next considers the self-looping edges from nodes 1 and 1 ; it notes that
the labels of the destination nodes (1 and 1 ) are identical, and that 1 is already 1 -visited, and thus does not
walk forward to these nodes. Next the algorithm considers edges (1; 2) and (1 ; 2 ), nds 2 and 2 equivalent,
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Figure 5: Graphs G for P , G for P and Gsig for RSS solution.
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and adds node 2 to Gsig marked \originally 2 -visited". Only one edge leaves node 2 in G (2 in G ); however,
in G this edge leads to node 1 whereas in G it leads to a new node, 3 . In the basic formulation of SafeSpace,
the algorithm would note that 1 is already in the safe space and would direct edge (2,1) to Select. With
the RSS solution, however, the algorithm duplicates node 1, creating 1dup on the \1 stack." The new node
is marked \originally 3 -visited." Both edges leaving this node (or rather, their corresponding edges in G
and G ) lead to equivalent nodes in G and G , causing those edges to point to the nodes marked \originally
1 -visited" and \originally 2 -visited", respectively.9 The algorithm terminates having selected no edges.
Note that the edges in the above graphs are not the pointers inserted in the RSS solution. The pointers have
not been included in this representation, and exist only to support the node stack data structure.
Notice the di erent roles played by P and P in this extension to SafeSpace. P guides the creation
of the bottom layer of nodes in Gsig , corresponding exactly to the concept of the safe space in the basic
formulation of the SafeSpace algorithm. However, now P plays a more active role; not only does P
determine equivalence, it also guides the stacking process in which nodes are respawned o of each other. In
addition, P also determines to which node in the stack a new edge is added. This interaction of P and P
changes the concept of the safe space for this extension to the SafeSpace algorithm. In essence, Respawning
Safe Space adds a dimension to the safe space generated by the basic algorithm. Because of this, we call
Gsig the cross safe space in the RSS extension.
We can bound the run time of this solution, as we create a new copy of a node only when we reenter the
safe space such that the node V already in the safe space is not marked V visited. But we know that at
each step, SafeSpace marks one node visited by another node. If we presume that the graph for P contains
n nodes and the graph for P contains m nodes, a node can only acquire jmj visited ags (and that would
require a rather contrived program to generate). Thus, at most jmnj steps need to be taken. Further, since
each step creates at most m new pointer links between nodes in the stack, with one new edge added from
the preceding node to the new node, the total run time is O(nm2 ).
Under the RSS solution, once the analysis phase is complete, we select traces just as we did for the regular
SafeSpace algorithm: we run a traversal of the cross safe space Gsig until the trace reaches the exit node
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9 This example illustrates a case in which G
sig is the same size as G . Clearly, Gsig can also be the same size as G: to prove
this, invert the graphs so that P is P and vice versa. At this point, one might imagine that Gsig is restricted to the maximum
of G and G ; as it happens, this is not the case. Nodes in G can appear on di erent stacks in Gsig , thus ensuring that the size
of Gsig can exceed both G and G .
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or the Select node. Test cases whose traces end at the Select node are rerun; the rest need not be rerun.
Of course, if we want maximal precision, we need to run the entire trace through Gsig , which would require
time unbounded in the size of the program. Instead, as we suggested for the basic formulation, we can
extract information from Gsig and use that to select test cases. In so doing, a certain amount of precision is
necessarily lost. The RSS solution, however, is primarily intended for proofs: approximation is unnecessary
in many cases since we do not care how much time the algorithm takes | only that its bias is contained in
the bias of the technique being proven safe (as we shall elaborate shortly).

5 Applications of the Framework
We have presented a framework for safe RTS techniques, including a semantic model and a generalized safe
RTS algorithm; next we show how this framework can be applied to real-world problems. In particular, the
use of the framework facilitates three tasks:
1. Proving that an existing RTS technique is safe.
2. De ning the set of programs over which an RTS technique is safe.
3. Generating new safe RTS techniques.
First, we provide an example of the application of the framework to the rst two problems. We describe
and demonstrate a ve-step process by which our framework can be used to assess the safety and regression
bias of RTS techniques, using DejaVu as a subject. In doing this, we also de ne the regression bias of DejaVu,
thus describing the set of programs over which DejaVu is safe.
Second, to further illustrate the generality of the framework, in Section 5.2 we sketch its application to
two additional safe RTS techniques, Pythia and TestTube.
Finally, in Section 5.3, we use our framework to create a new safe RTS algorithm targeting spreadsheetlike languages. Subsequently, we discuss how the techniques of this paper can facilitate the development of
safe RTS techniques in other ways: by specifying regression biases, testers should be able to easily recognize
safe RTS problems that are close to problems faced in the past, thus allowing reuse of pre-existing techniques.

5.1 An Analysis of the Safety and Regression Bias of DejaVu
We now turn to our illustration of the use of our framework for the analysis of an existing RTS technique,
DejaVu. Before proceeding with this illustration we brie y summarize the DejaVu technique. Readers
interested in greater detail on DejaVu should consult [22, 26].

5.1.1 The DejaVu RTS technique
The DejaVu technique is actually a family of related algorithms for performing safe RTS. One member of
this family has been implemented as a tool that has subsequently been evaluated in several empirical studies
to determine its precision and eciency over a variety of sample programs and test suites [7, 21, 26].
DejaVu requires that we rst transform the source code for P and P into control- ow graph (CFG)
representations G and G [3]. The CFGs required by DejaVu use one node for each simple statement in
a program, with transitions that model explicit and implicit control ow between statements. Start and
0

0

26

Exit nodes are added to the CFGs to simplify analysis. Depending on the version of the technique used,
these CFGs can span either single procedures or multiple procedures. In formulations of DejaVu using
single-procedure CFGs, the union of the test cases selected for each procedure constitutes T .
DejaVu also requires an approximation of a control- ow-based execution trace for each test case t on P .
0

De nition 18. Control-Flow-Based Execution Trace: A record of the code statements
executed by test case t on program P in order of execution.

does not actually maintain the entire execution trace for each test case; instead, the tool maintains
a bit vector that denotes which edges in the CFG G have been traversed, omitting order of traversal and
traversal frequency. Given this trace information, DejaVu executes on pairs of CFGs from identically named
procedures in P and P , generating a set of dangerous edges that can be used for test selection.
Before describing this process further, however, we de ne several concepts underlying DejaVu.
DejaVu

0

De nition 19. Modi cation-Traversing Test Case: A test case t is modi cation-traversing

for P and P if the execution trace for t on P is not identical to the execution trace of t on P ,
given a token by token comparison of the semantic words associated with the nodes in the traces.
0

0

De nition 20. Modi cation-Revealing Test Case: A test case t is modi cation-revealing
for P and P if the execution of t on P produces di erent output behavior from that produced
by t on P .
0

0

De nition 21. Fault-Revealing Test Case: A test case t is fault revealing for P if the
0

execution of t on P reveals a fault in P .
0

0

De nition 22. Dangerous Edge: A dangerous edge is an edge in the CFG for P such that

cannot guarantee that any test case traversing that edge is non-modi cation-traversing
for P and P .

DejaVu

0

As we shall discuss in some detail later when examining DejaVu's regression bias, by selecting all tests through
dangerous edges, DejaVu selects all test cases that are modi cation-traversing for P and P [22]. As Reference
[25] shows, when certain conditions hold, these test cases include all test cases that are modi cation-revealing
for P and P , and thereby contain all non-obsolete test cases that are fault-revealing for P .
Figure 6 presents one of the more basic DejaVu algorithms presented in [22]. Numerous optimizations
have been added to this algorithm to make DejaVu more precise, as discussed in [22, 26]. For our purposes,
however, this algorithm suces. The algorithm operates by simultaneously traversing CFGs G and G . If the
traversal of an edge leads to a pair of nodes < V; V > such that the statements represented by those nodes
di er, then the algorithm adds the edge leading to that pair of nodes to the dangerous edge set. In addition,
if the algorithm reaches an edge in P that does not have a corresponding edge in P , it places that edge in
the dangerous edge set. Further, for this simple version, if the node V in a node-pair has an outgoing edge
that does not match an outgoing edge of V , this version of the algorithm adds all edges leading to < V; V >
to the dangerous edge set. Such extra edges in P must result in the preceding edges being selected, because
such extra edges might represent changes in behavior due to additions of new switch cases.
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algorithm SelectTests(P ,P ,T ):T
input
P ,P : base and modi ed versions of a procedure
output
D: the set of dangerous edges
1. begin
2.
D=
0

0

0

3.
construct G and G , CFGs for P and P , with entry nodes E and E
4.
Compare( E , E )
5.
return D
6. end
0

0

0

0

procedure Compare(N ,N )
input
N and N : nodes in G and G
7. begin
8.
mark N \N -visited"
9.
for each successor C of N in G do
0

0

0

0

10.
L = the label on edge (N ,C ) or  if (N ,C ) is unlabeled
11.
C =the node in G such that (N ,C ) has label L or null if no such edge
12.
if C =null
13.
D = D [ (N ,C )
14.
else if C is not marked \C -visited"
15.
if : LEquivalent( C ,C )
16.
D = D [ (N ,C )
17.
else
18.
Compare( C , C )
19.
endif
20.
endif
21.
endfor
22.
for each edge (N , C ) lacking a corresponding edge (N , C ) do
23.
locate all directed edges (X; N ), where X is any vertex
24.
D = D [ (X ,N )
25.
endfor
26. end
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Figure 6:

DejaVu

Algorithm.

5.1.2 Analysis and proof of safety
At this point, we wish to provide an example of a proof of safety involving SafeSpace. Such proofs are
predicated on the safety of the general formulation of SafeSpace; given components that are safe | safe
, , and  functions, for instance | we have shown that the general formulation of SafeSpace is safe (it
selects all test cases whose traces exit Gsig ). Given SafeSpace's safety, we can construct a proof of safety for
another technique by generating a proxy algorithm for that technique. This proxy is built using SafeSpace as
a structural guideline, but using components (semantic words, state models,  functions, etc.) that emulate
the behavior of the technique to be proven safe.
Let A be an RTS technique that we wish to prove safe, and let A be the target regression bias for
10
A. To prove that A is safe, we construct a proxy algorithm I | an instantiation of the SafeSpace
algorithm designed to emulate the speci ed behavior of A. This emulation need not be exact: A might make
approximations that cause it to select a larger number of test cases than I , but as long as the set of test
cases selected by A is a superset of the set selected by I , then if I is proven safe, we know that A is safe.
To ensure that a particular SafeSpace instantiation I is appropriate for our proof, we must complete
two overall tasks:
10 The target bias A for A need not be the same as the the de facto bias of A { we might be interested in proving the safety
B

B

of A for only a subset of the programs and testing methodologies to which A in fact applies. However, the target regression
bias must be contained within A's actual bias; for the rest of this presentation we make the assumption that this is the case.
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1. Prove that I is safe over regression bias I  A .
2. Prove that every test case selected by I is also selected by A.
B

B

It might seem that we are substituting one hard problem for another equally hard problem in step 1.
However, SafeSpace was deliberately designed to enhance clarity, depending primarily on the conceptually
simple idea of a safe space (clarity was, in fact, an important reason for restricting the cross safe space to an
extension). Further, we already have proven SafeSpace safe as long as its components ful ll the restrictions
discussed in Section 4. Thus, to complete the proof, we need only to construct the component functions and
descriptions of the primitives used in the technique, while proving that these pieces of the technique ful ll
the requirements of the stable semantics condition and prevent rogue agents.
Of course, in step one, we might discover that we cannot create a technique I safe over I  A using
components that emulate A. This tells us that the basic primitives and logic of A are insucient for safety.
We describe a ve-step proof process for RTS techniques based on the logic described above, but in
this description we emphasize the iterative nature of this process. In particular, the logic described above
demands that we have a de nition of technique A's regression bias, that is, the programs and test suites over
which A must be safe. In practice, however, we might begin the proof process not fully understanding what
characteristics actually re ect this bias, or as the process proceeds, we might nd that our initial assumptions
about this bias were either insucient or overly general. A fundamental part of the safe RTS process is the
establishment of a regression bias, while a fundamental part of a safe RTS proof is establishment of safety
over a well-de ned bias. Thus, at every step of the proof, we must consider whether the bias is sucient for
the task at hand.
B

B

Five-step proof process:
1. Establish the regression bias A for which RTS technique A is to be proven safe.
2. Specify a state model S and a semantic word set  that ful ll the regression bias. Explicate
the nature of the agent sets  and : in relation to this bias (consider ways in which the
semantic word set and state model might fail to re ect real program behavior).
3. Construct safety-preserving , , and  functions out of S and .
4. Transform trace information into abstract execution traces for SafeSpace using the semantic
word set  and the ordering implied by the  function.
5. Show that the SafeSpace instantiation I established in steps 2 through 4 has a regression
bias containing that of A, and show that if I selects a test case t, then A selects t.
B

Note that the SafeSpace instantiation of the safe RTS algorithm A need not use the same state model or
semantic word set used by A. In general, it may be easier to prove a technique safe if the general algorithm
views the code in the same way, but that need not always be the case. In particular, if the structure of
an RTS technique di ers from depth- rst search, the primitives must be adapted so that depth- rst search
makes sense. Alternatively, a di erent formulation of the generalized safe RTS algorithm could be used.
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Step 1: Establish DejaVu's Regression Bias
DejaVu imposes

several requirements on subject programs. First, DejaVu requires that all test cases that are
fault-revealing for P be modi cation revealing for P and P , and that all test cases that are modi cationrevealing for P and P be modi cation traversing for P and P . As noted in Section 5.1.1, it has been shown
that under certain conditions, DejaVu selects every test case in T that is modi cation-traversing for P and
P [22]. Thus, as a rst approximation to its regression bias, we can say that DejaVu is safe in all situations
in which all fault-revealing test cases are modi cation traversing.11 However, we still need to specify the
types of programs for which this is true and the types for which this is not true.
In general, fault-revealing test cases are not always modi cation-traversing. In order for the fact that
a test case t is fault-revealing for P to imply that t is modi cation-traversing for P and P , P must be
correct for T .12 Otherwise, P and P might exhibit equivalent behavior (and traces) on t, but P might
exhibit a fault on t, inherited from P . DejaVu's regression bias includes the assumption that faults occur
deterministically; thus, if test suite T was run on P and all faults discovered in P were corrected without
introducing new faults revealable by T , P is correct for T .
Two problems arise as a result of this bias: rst, an attempt to correct a fault might be made, but the
attempt might fail; second, nondeterministic behavior might hide a fault still remaining in the system. The
rst problem is easily recti ed: test cases that exposed faults in P can be rerun for P , regardless of the
results of DejaVu's analysis. Nondeterministic test cases (see e.g. [10]), however, are not so easily handled by
DejaVu. Nondeterministic test cases explore di erent input-output relations on di erent runs. In particular,
on di erent runs, such test cases might explore di erent regions of the input space or result in the execution
of di erent paths through the code. When such nondeterminism exists for a test case, we cannot assert that
correct execution of the test case proves that the test case cannot exhibit a fault.13
One dichotomy of nondeterminism is of particular interest: explicit nondeterminism versus implicit nondeterminism. Explicit nondeterminism occurs when software designers intend code to behave nondeterministically and can control this behavior within the testing process. Implicit nondeterminism occurs when the
software is sensitive to aspects of the environment that cannot be strictly controlled in testing environments.
As a simple example of explicit nondeterminism, random-number generators create nondeterministic
sequences of numbers. The key feature of explicit nondeterminism is that testers can \freeze" the behavior of
the nondeterministic segment of code. In general, explicit nondeterminism can be dealt with by calculating
one valid deterministic behavior and replacing the nondeterministic code with code that reproduces that
e ect. For instance, a pseudo-random-number generator can be presented with the same seed on every run
of the program.
Implicit nondeterminism, on the other hand, represents the worst of the rogue agents :. Implicit nondeterminism includes any type of random behavior that cannot be localized, predicted, and controlled. For
instance, in a real-time program, page faults present possibly signi cant e ects on response time, but usually
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11 Note that we begin our analysis of DejaVu with a great deal of knowledge about DejaVu's safety; proofs for new techniques,
however, might begin with signi cantly less knowledge.
12 Also, as we discussed in Section 2, obsolete test cases must be removed from T . Obsolete test cases will almost certainly be
modi cation-traversing, but need not be fault-revealing. Obsolete test cases should either be disposed of or incorporated into
the process of testing new functionality | that task, however, is not the subject of this paper.
13 Strictly speaking, this is not absolutely true. There might be cases where it is known that only a small set of nondeterministic
behaviors can occur; if we see the entire set over multiple runs then we know that each possibility has been exercised. In general,
however, nondeterministic test cases are not so well-behaved.
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cannot be predicted. Similarly, in multi-threaded programs, statements may be executed in nondeterministic
order, resulting in nondeterministic behavior when shared variables are incorrectly accessed or when output
behaviors are not properly synchronized.
Unlike explicit nondeterminism, implicit nondeterminism forces us to re ne our regression bias. Our
initial de nition of DejaVu's bias required only that a test case being fault-revealing must imply that it
is modi cation-revealing, which in turn must imply that it is modi cation-traversing. Satisfaction of this
requirement requires that P be correct for T . However, we know that for P to be proven correct for T , T must
be deterministic for P . Nondeterminism is not consistent with this requirement. Thus, DejaVu's regression
bias includes only those programs that can be transformed by trivial changes (where trivial depends on
constraints on the testing process) into programs that behave deterministically in all signi cant ways. Note
that this bias restricts not only the code constructs used, but the type of the program as well. For instance,
applying DejaVu to an arbitrary real-time program seems dicult to accomplish while preserving safety. We
cannot trivially change a real-time program to behave deterministically; if we did perform such changes, the
changes would violate the timing-dependent nature of the program.
Speci cally, DejaVu is obviously safe only for programs that compute values in a time-independent fashion. In other words, DejaVu is not obviously safe for multi-threaded programs, programs that poll the outside
environment for nondeterministically arriving input, or any other program that might exhibit di erent execution traces on di erent runs due either to varying inputs or varying internal states in the computer. Many
programs, however, act in linear fashion, or react consistently to input regardless of when the input occurs.
Over these programs, DejaVu's regression bias holds.
In addition, DejaVu targets only imperative languages. DejaVu uses control ow graphs to select dangerous edges. In other languages such as spreadsheet languages (as we shall see), control ow is not relevant.
DejaVu's regression bias must be considered in relation not only to programs, but also to testing methodologies. For example, since DejaVu approximates traces with bit vectors, if a test methodology for a program
that uses polling could guarantee that each input either consistently arrived before the polling structure
asked for it, or consistently arrived after at least one loop through the poll was processed, DejaVu could
operate safely on that program. Without this guarantee, a section of code might be executed by some runs of
a test case, but not by other runs, thus generating faulty traces. With the above constraint, all traces would
be identical since DejaVu records only the statements executed, not their frequency. Testing methodologies
are an integral part of the regression bias for a safe RTS technique and constitute part of the space over
which a bias is valid. Some software might be amenable to the safe application of DejaVu with one testing
methodology but not with another.

Step 2: Specify the State Model, Semantic Word Set, and Agent Sets
At this point, we have speci ed our expectations for the regression bias of DejaVu based on preliminary
considerations of nondeterminism. We should now explicitly consider the mapping of the code to primitives
that is assumed by DejaVu, in order to expose further potential threats to the safety of the algorithm.
Since DejaVu uses fairly simple abstractions of the code, this mapping is fairly simple. Analysis techniques
operating on higher-level abstractions such as speci cations or interpretations of programs as plans would
need to explore the relation of primitives to code and computing environment in greater depth.
First, because DejaVu does not incorporate aspects of the external environment into its semantic word
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if (aExpr)
statement1;
else
statement2;

addi $r0, $r0, aExpr
beq $r0, $0, L1
(statement1)
jmp L2
L1:
(statement2)
L2:

Figure 7: An if/else statement and corresponding MIPS assembler code. The term aExpr represents a
value in a register, and strictly speaking actually refers to a particular register.
set, DejaVu must assume that the external environment is constant: therefore, the external environment is
not part of the state for DejaVu. Thus, we can use the standard de nition of state as program memory.
Since DejaVu's bias does not contain programs that are dependent on high response times, we need not
concern ourselves with caches or virtual memory (beyond assuming that they are coherent). Further, we will
assume that the computing environment is identical between the execution of P and P . Speci cally, this
requirement entails that we use the same compiler, operating system and machine con guration to build and
test P that was used to build and test P .
In general, the code of P and P will be in the subset X of the above state, while live data values will
be in S ? X . Placing the code in X might seem counterintuitive since the code directly a ects program
execution. However, the program that we are studying is viewed as external to the state; thus, the code in
this case can a ect the program only if the program can rewrite its own code, which is generally not the case
for languages such as C in modern computer systems.
The semantic word set is even more simple. DejaVu examines code at the statement level; thus, a semantic
word corresponds to a single (simple) code statement. There is one semantic word for each normalized code
statement that is not lexically identical to another word already in . Thus, there are an in nite number of
possible semantic words in , although any particular program contains only a nite number.
The agent sets are associated with the properties that must hold, or that fail to hold for rogue agents.
In other words, the valid agent set consists of boolean expressions such as EQUIVALENT COMPILER ^
EQUIVALENT OS ^ : : : , but only when these expressions are true. Rogue agents consist of the same
expressions when the expressions are not true. In essence, when a semantic word is bound with an agent,
the truth of the boolean expression determines whether the agent is valid or rogue. These expressions also
hold between the executions of semantic words | recall the properties p that must hold between semantic
word executions. If a rogue agent acts on the non-transient state independently of the execution of semantic
words, it violates the model of program behavior.
Consider the speci cation of a simple set of semantic words in DejaVu: the set of words originating with
the if/else construct. In the following, we assume that the set of potential expressions in the if/else
have already been proven safe or unsafe. If the expression is not safe, we automatically reject test cases
traversing the if/else regardless of the safety of the if/else construct itself. Given the safety of potential
expressions, we proceed to prove that if/else is a safe construct with respect to DejaVu. An if/else
statement has at least one clear interpretation, as given in Figure 7 [20].14
Assuming that this format of the if/else is the only format produced by the compiler, and ignoring
the existence of additional else-if clauses for brevity, we can readily specify the behavior of the if/else
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The Figure uses the MIPS assembly language. Equivalent code could be generated for any modern assembly language.

32

construct. The expression aExpr has already been proven safe or unsafe; thus, where aExpr is safe we need
only worry about the if/else construct itself. Given then that aExpr is safe, aExpr correctly produces a
value (as speci ed by the peculiarities of the C language). If aExpr is not equal to 0, the beq does nothing
and statement 1 is executed; otherwise, the beq changes the program counter and statement 2 is executed.
After the execution of statement1, a jump occurs to a label following statement2. No other behaviors
are possible if assembly code fully characterizes behavior, as it must if the regression bias for DejaVu holds.
Thus, the if/else is deterministic and the if/else construct is safe for DejaVu.
Of course, speci cation in terms of assembly language is only one approach to proving safety. Formal
proof methods could be used for each statement, or informal natural language descriptions could be used,
depending on the demands placed upon us by the testing situation.

Step 3: Construct , , and  Functions
To use an instantiation I of SafeSpace to prove the safety of RTS algorithm A, we must construct the , 
and  functions to be used by I . These functions may duplicate processes used by A, or they may simplify
these processes; the key to constructing the functions is that in all cases in which A's regression bias holds,
the functions must ensure that I selects a set of test cases that is equivalent to or a subset of the set of test
cases selected by A. By ensuring that these functions maintain this relationship, we ensure that a proof that
I is safe implies that A is safe.
We begin with the  function. For the instantiation of SafeSpace that we are here constructing, the 
function arises naturally from the description of the semantic word set. In DejaVu, two semantic words are
identical if the normalized lexical values of the words are identical. Thus, in the DejaVu instantiation of
SafeSpace, given two semantic words (statements), once we remove comments and spurious white space we
simply compare the two statements to determine lexicographic equivalence.
That this choice of  suces for safety depends also on the rest of this ve-step process, but for the
moment, we can partially justify the choice in and of itself. In Section 4, we stated that the  function
must output \equivalent" only when two semantic words produce equivalent behaviors given identical states.
Since we either have no nondeterministic constructs in the program, or automatically select any test case
encountering them,  will operate only on deterministic constructs. But since  outputs \equivalent" only
when two statements are lexicographically identical, the behaviors of equivalent words will be identical.
Thus, this  function meets the requirements speci ed in Section 4. Note that equivalence in this context
does not imply that the same transitions are taken out of two nodes when the nodes are equivalent under .
The conjoinment of the  and  functions is needed for that.
Now, turning to the  and  functions, these functions act on the code and program environment to create
a graphical abstraction of the program. Arbitrary graph representations might not be sucient for safety
over the regression bias in which we are interested. Thus, as we specify  and  functions, we must consider
how they mesh with SafeSpace as a whole. The  function must break up the program into nodes that can
be processed by the  function. Similarly, the  function must order these nodes into a graph such that the
intersection process creates a meaningful and safe Gsig . Note that SafeSpace selects not only on the basis
of the  function, but also when considering edges out of a node: the justi cations for selection at this stage
must arise naturally out of the  function and must preserve safety. However, the tasks of  and  are not
just to preserve safety, but also to construct a SafeSpace instantiation with a simple regression bias that
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is contained in the true regression bias of A. Preferably, such a bias should be simple enough to transcribe
into a set of guidelines to be used when evaluating whether A can be used safely on a particular program.
The  function for our SafeSpace instantiation of DejaVu is rather simple: in fact, we speci ed it when
we constructed our  function. The  function maps individual code statements to nodes. Note that the
de nition of a statement is somewhat idiosyncratic as used by DejaVu: an entire while loop is not a single
statement, for instance, but rather one statement for the rst line of the while, and one statement for each
statement contained in the body of the while loop. This is necessary, however, to allow the use of  at a ne
granularity. As we stated earlier, the  function orders statements, creating links between nodes as speci ed
by the partial or total order. In the case of the instantiation of SafeSpace that we are constructing for
DejaVu,  implements a total order that structures the nodes into a control- ow graph. Note that cases
where edges have been added or deleted are already dealt with safely by the SafeSpace algorithm.
We have previously shown that our  function suces for safety. A safe  function, meanwhile, must link
nodes together such that an unapproximated test trace can be mapped into the signature graph such that the
Select node is never encountered if the test case need not be re-executed. In the case of DejaVu, a control- ow
ordering is sucient for safety. DejaVu itself, of course, uses approximated traces, but as we stated earlier,
a more precise interpretation of the algorithm is often desirable; we thus decided to create a SafeSpace
instantiation using full traces. In step 5 of the proof process, we will show that the test cases selected
on the basis of full traces are also selected by the approximated traces, although the approximated traces
might result in extra test cases being selected. In Section 5.2.2, we describe a di erent graph formulation
for TestTube; this same process could have been followed for DejaVu as well, although the safety of DejaVu
might not have been as easily demonstrated by that approach.
Note that, although it turns out that the  function is simpler than the  function for DejaVu, this need
not always be the case. Some abstractions might have very simple orderings, but might require pervasive
global transformations by the  function.

Step 4: Construct Abstracted Execution Traces
Although SafeSpace itself does not perform test selection | relegating that task to a subsidiary process
that uses Gsig | we must ensure that our execution traces actually suce for safe test selection on the basis
of our signature graph. Abstract traces are constructed out of the same building blocks as the graphical
representations for P and P . Further, they obey the same precedence rules, except that traces are paths
through the graph rather than graphs themselves. Thus, traces are mapped to a string of semantic words.
The key to the safety of a trace lies in the correctness of the semantic word set and the ordering of the
graph. If the semantic word set satis es the SSC and no rogue agents transform the state between semantic
words, and if the traces can be embedded in the graph Gsig (which means that no edges to Select occur in
the trace), then the test case can be safely excluded.
Given the primitives and the  and  functions for DejaVu, the construction of abstract traces from
real trace data is simple. We convert existing statement-level trace information into the abstract semantic
word set as with , ordering the primitives in the trace by their sequence of execution. Note that this
transformation is not necessarily a ected by  or . The  and  functions act on P and P , constructing
graphs G and G . The execution traces, on the other hand, are created out of information gathered from
previous executions of P . Oftentimes, however, the creation of execution traces is similar to the creation of
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G, and it involves constructing a subgraph of G using information that corresponds directly to subsets of P .

That these traces suce for the role of safe traces in a SafeSpace instantiation for DejaVu is trivial given
that Gsig represents a subset of a control- ow graph G (or as it will later turn out, the cross safe space
Gsig of G and G ). A trace will end up in the Select node unless it can make its way through Gsig without
traversing a Select edge.
0

Step 5: Show that (I  A ) and that (I selects t) ) (A selects T ).
B

B

The ve steps of the proof process guide us towards a regression bias for a technique that is amenable to
a SafeSpace instantiation. Once a viable bias A has been speci ed, the SafeSpace instantiation I must
be proven safe over that bias. The process of constructing I de nes a bias I for I , and given this bias we
must show two things: (5.1) that the bias I over which we proved I safe is equivalent to, or a superset of,
the desired bias A of A (which itself might be a proper subset of A's real bias); and (5.2) that A selects at
least the same test cases I selects over A .
Where (5.1) is concerned, it may not be obvious that I can be made an actual superset of A : this,
however, is where we take advantage of the fact that A is a speci ed bias rather than a de facto bias for
a real technique. Because a speci ed bias can strictly detail the properties of the set of programs and test
suites that it contains, I can be made a superset, even though the bias of the real technique A might
contain bizarre outlier programs over which it is accidentally and unjusti ably safe. This is sucient for
our purposes, because we are interested only in proving a technique safe for a particular regression bias: the
actual regression bias is purely of academic interest. We still need to ensure that the bias of I is contained
in the bias of A, but this can be done by ensuring that I is always at least as precise as A, as we discuss in
step 5.2.
Where (5.2) is concerned, we must show that a fault-revealing test case is selected by I over A (or
equivalently, given 5.1, over I ) only if A also would select that test case. Given this criterion, I must be at
least as precise as A over the programs in I . If I is more precise than A, this means that A is safe over A
as well. To ensure this containment for DejaVu, we use the RSS extension to SafeSpace presented earlier.
Unlike the basic formulation of SafeSpace, DejaVu selects edges only when it encounters nodes that are
lexically di erent, or encounters nodes with changed numbers of edges or di erent labels on edges. This is
similar to the RSS solution that we discussed in Section 4.4.1, except that DejaVu does not construct a cross
safe space. Instead, DejaVu selects all test cases whose traces contain the edge that lead to the changed
nodes, even if those particular test cases are not reentrant. To prove DejaVu safe over A , given the steps
already completed, we need only show that on programs and test suites in the space covered by IB , DejaVu
selects a test case whenever I selects a test case.
As Figure 2 shows, SafeSpace adds edges that point to the Select node in only four places: lines 13, 17,
20, and 24. Line 13 corresponds to the case when node N has edges that are not possessed by node N in
the original graph G. In this case, because of the possibility of default edges, SafeSpace must select the
edge leading to that node pair. DejaVu selects on identical edges due to lines 22-24 in the DejaVu algorithm
(Figure 6). The second case, line 16, occurs whenever there is an edge e exiting the node N that does not
have a counterpart in N , the node corresponding to N in the modi ed program P . DejaVu selects these
edges in lines 12-13. In the third case, line 20 of SafeSpace, an edge e is added if the node N reached in P is
not equivalent to the node N reached in P via that edge. In the case of this instantiation of the SafeSpace
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algorithm, the  function is lexical equivalence, which means that any edge leading to lexically di erent nodes
is selected. Notice that in lines 15-16 of the DejaVu algorithm, exactly these edges are selected. The nal
case, line 24 of SafeSpace, does not result in the selection of any test cases in this instantiation since we are
using the Respawning Safe Space solution. Note that when DejaVu selects the test cases associated with an
edge, it selects all test cases associated with that edge. When SafeSpace using RSS selects the test cases
on an edge, it selects only test cases that pass through the node on the stack connected to that edge. Thus,
DejaVu selects more test cases than SafeSpace, but it selects all of the test cases selected by SafeSpace.

5.2 Analyses of Other Safe RTS Algorithms
is only one example of a safe RTS algorithm. In this section, we brie y consider two other existing
algorithms, Pythia[29] and TestTube[11], in the light of our framework and the previous analysis of DejaVu.
In doing so, we gain further insights into the use of the framework.

DejaVu

5.2.1 Pythia
First, we shall focus on the safe RTS technique that bears the closest resemblance to DejaVu: Pythia. Our
fundamental goal is to brie y show that Pythia's regression bias is essentially the same as DejaVu's; in so
doing, we suggest how our framework could be utilized in constructing a proof of safety for Pythia.
Pythia performs safe RTS on C programs. Like DejaVu, Pythia proves equivalence using lexical identity.
Instead of generating CFGs and then performing analysis on them, however, Pythia uses commonly existing
Unix tools to directly perform textual di erencing on the subject programs[29]. Pythia rst uses the Unix
tool pretty to normalize the source les for P and P . Pythia then divides the normalized source code
into basic blocks; these basic blocks constitute the semantic word set for a instantiation IP of SafeSpace
modeling Pythia. The state and agent sets for this instantiation of SafeSpace are identical to those used
in DejaVu's instantiation of SafeSpace. Because Pythia uses basic blocks, Pythia's execution traces are
identical to DejaVu's except that the elements are basic block transitions rather than statement transitions.
Like DejaVu, Pythia relies on a transition model based on control ow between basic blocks to determine
sequencing; however, for Pythia, this transition model is not explicitly constructed, but determined implicitly
from the syntax of code statements as required during the test selection process.
Given normalized les divided into basic blocks, Pythia executes the Unix tool diff on the two normalized programs P and P , attempting to locate blocks that have changed. In the simple case in which the
internal structure of blocks has not changed between P and P , Pythia provides a solution as accurate as
DejaVu. In the case where block structure has changed, Pythia defaults to the only safe alternative given
its level of analysis and selects the block(s) that can be determined to safely precede the changed block in
terms of control ow. This approach can create greater imprecision than that exhibited by DejaVu.
Given this description and the close relationship between Pythia and DejaVu, it should be apparent how
to construct a proof of safety for Pythia. Essentially, a SafeSpace instantiation IP for Pythia would be
identical to the instantiation I used above for DejaVu, except that the set of primitives would be composed of
basic blocks rather than code statements. However, since a basic block is just a linear set of code statements,
the graph for IP would simply be a condensed form of the graph used by I . Because we are not interested in
eciency in a proof, IP need not select the preceding basic block if block structure changes; that ineciency
is a result of using the Unix tool diff and not traversing blocks in control ow order | this also further
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illustrates that a proof of safety of an RTS algorithm A may utilize a SafeSpace instantiation of greater
precision than A. As a result Pythia's IP selects the same test cases selected by DejaVu's I .
Thus, clearly, Pythia's SafeSpace instantiation IP is safe over the same regression bias I as DejaVu's
SafeSpace instantiation I . Further, since the instances of Pythia's and DejaVu's imprecisions with respect
to their SafeSpace instantiations are unlikely to result in extensions to the types of program covered, the
regression biases for DejaVu and Pythia are the same.
B

5.2.2

TestTube

performs safe RTS by using lexical analysis at the level of symbols in the global namespace of C
programs [11]. For TestTube, only functions, macros, types, and global variables exist. The current version
of TestTube relies on the existence of several subsidiary tools, including a program instrumenter (App), a
program entity database (CIA), and the set of scripts that constitutes TestTube itself.
Like DejaVu and Pythia, TestTube relies on lexical equivalence, although TestTube's approach is simpler.
The CIA database associates checksum information with the entities in the global namespace for both program
versions. TestTube compares the checksums of all identical global symbols in the two program versions to
determine which ones di er. TestTube then determines which other entities could be in uenced by the
di erences in the changed entities.15 Thus, for instance, a global variable used in a changed function is
henceforth considered changed itself; functions called by a changed function, however, are not thereby
considered changed in and of themselves.
The execution traces used by TestTube are generated by the App instrumenter, which records the set
of functions invoked during each test. This information is used in conjunction with the CIA database to
generate a list of entities potentially a ected by changed functions. This list and the entity di erence list
generated by CIA for the two program versions indicate whether or not a test case can be safely excluded.
While TestTube resembles DejaVu and Pythia in many ways, there are also many structural di erences.
One signi cant di erence is that TestTube does not explicitly consider control- ow order: test traces list
functions called and global entities potentially referenced, but with no particular order imposed. While this
can be viewed as just an approximation to what DejaVu and Pythia do, it is appropriate to view TestTube
in its own right. A SafeSpace instantiation for TestTube, then, should re ect TestTube's unique qualities.
First, in a SafeSpace instantiation IT of TestTube, the set of semantic words can contain the checksum ids
for functions, macros, type de nitions, and global variables | everything in a program's global namespace.
TestTube's models of the state and agent set parallel those of DejaVu and Pythia. The traces for this
SafeSpace proof resemble regular TestTube traces: they consist of a set of unordered semantic words.
Unlike TestTube, however, an extra symbol \End" is added to the end of each trace, where all other entities
in the trace are partially ordered such that they must occur before \End." This last symbol is the only
ordered member of the trace.
Given that TestTube does not explicitly consider control- ow order, we will use mostly unordered graphs
for the proof. Speci cally,  maps semantic words in the programs to nodes in no particular order. The 
function then joins these nodes into a complete directed graph, as shown in Figure 8. Edges in this graph are
labeled with the value of their destination. The \Start" node is then added and connected to all other nodes
in the graph. Edges leading from the \Start" node to other nodes are labeled with the id of the destination
TestTube

15

Note that \change" here actually denotes cases where the entity is added, deleted, or modi ed.
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A: void function1();
B: void function2();
C: void function3();
D: #define MACRO1 1

c

Start

d

a

b
b

A

b

d
a

B

a
c

a

c

d

C

d

b

D

end

c
end

end

end

End

Figure 8: Left: three function declarations and a macro (labeled with letters); right: graph representation
of program
node. Finally, an \End" node, which corresponds to the extra semantic word placed in the execution traces,
is added, and directed edges are added from this node to all nodes other than the \Start" node.
During the execution of SafeSpace on G and G , any changed node N will cause all edges (X; N ) to be
diverted to the Select node; following execution, all traces containing changed entities will necessarily end up
in the Select node of Gsig , no matter how we order the entities of the traces (except of course, that \End"
must be last).
Although we do not provide a proof here, the regression bias of this SafeSpace instantiation IT necessarily
contains the bias of DejaVu. This is the case because both DejaVu and TestTube have been shown to select
all modi cation-traversing test cases [21], and TestTube has been further shown to select all test cases
selected by DejaVu. Because TestTube does not explicitly consider control ow, TestTube's bias might be
non-trivially larger than the biases of DejaVu and Pythia: as we noted in Section 3, however, this only
means the set of programs over which TestTube is safe is potentially larger, but it does not in and of itself
make TestTube a more e ective technique.16
0

5.3 Utilizing the Safe RTS Framework to Create a New Algorithm
So far, we have used the safe RTS framework to prove RTS algorithms safe. We now consider another use of
the framework: facilitating the creation of new safe RTS algorithms. As an example, we propose a new RTS
technique designed for spreadsheet languages, rather than the imperative programs addressed by DejaVu,
Pythia, and TestTube.17 To the best of our knowledge, this new RTS technique is the rst safe RTS
technique targeting programs outside of the deterministic, imperative regression bias. By demonstrating
the use of our framework in this context, we provide evidence that the framework is generally applicable.
16 In fact, previous studies by the authors have shown that TestTube can cost either more or less than DejaVu, depending on
details of the subject programs and test suites [7, 21].
17 This algorithm is particularly interesting in that the framework it creates is widely applicable to declarative languages,
although the particular template functions used would be inappropriate given that di erent sets of requirements govern graphics
content languages. For example, like spreadsheet languages, VRML has nodes that contain geometry and links that route
messages between nodes. This structure suggests that the partial-order approach we use for spreadsheet languages would be
useful for VRML, even though VRML has many complications have not been considered for the spreadsheet algorithm (for
instance, node hierarchies, in nite message loops, and script nodes potentially not meshing with the declarative paradigm [4, 9].
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formula ::= BLANK j expr
expr ::= CONSTANT j CELLREF j in xExpr j
pre xExpr j ifExpr
in xExpr ::= subExpr in xOperator subExpr
pre xExpr ::= unaryPre xOperator subExpr j
binaryPre xOperator subExpr subExpr
ifExpr ::= IF subExpr THEN subExpr ELSE subExpr j
IF subExpr THEN subExpr
subExpr ::= CONSTANT j CELLREF j (expr)
in xOperator ::= +j ? j  j=j AND j OR j = j ...
unaryPre xOperator ::= NOT j ...
binaryPre xOperator ::= LINE j BOX j INLIST j ...

Table 1: Subset of Forms/3 Grammar.
Creating a safe RTS algorithm for spreadsheet languages is also, however, a useful goal in and of itself.
Techniques for testing programs in spreadsheet languages di er from techniques for testing programs in
imperative languages. Some of these di erences will be discussed in this paper; however, we refer the reader
to other references for more detail [23, 27, 28].

5.3.1 The spreadsheet language paradigm (using Forms/3)
The term \spreadsheet languages" refers to a class of declarative visual languages that interlink sets of
formulas to generate outputs; usually, only the nal outputs are written to the screen | intermediate
calculations are performed invisibly. Since spreadsheet languages can potentially express a wide range of
behaviors, we have chosen to consider, as a representative of these languages, a subset of the visual research
programming language Forms/3 [28]. Table 1 presents the grammar for this subset. The subset that we
have chosen represents the behavior found in typical spreadsheet applications.
Figure 9 depicts a Forms/3 program containing several cells, with their formulas displayed; this program
calculates the root(s) of quadratic and linear equations. As the gure illustrates, unlike more \traditional"
spreadsheet languages, Forms/3 does not restrict cells to a grid pattern. To create such a program, users
place formulas in the individual cells, and the system responds to edits by updating other cells (or at least,
other visible cells) that depend on those cells. Formulas in cells can access the results of other cells, thus
imposing a causal ordering on the set of nodes that must be satis ed for correct computation. In general
there are many possible sequences of formula evaluations leading to correct results, and the evaluation engine
running beneath the scenes is free to choose any such order, provided that the data dependencies between
cells are maintained. All correct Forms/3 programs are guaranteed to halt due to the absence of cycles in
the causal ordering.
The testing process model for the spreadsheet language used in this paper is based on a model presented
in [28]. The execution of a test case on a spreadsheet involves placing test values in input cells (cells
whose formulas are constant) and then checking query cells (output cells of interest) after the program has
updated itself, to determine whether those cells contain proper values. A particular query cell contains a
mini-program that computes a formula; formulas potentially depend on the values of several other cells.
Thus, before a cell (query or otherwise) can be evaluated, the cells upon which that cell is data dependent
must be evaluated. The evaluation engine keeps track of which cells have been changed and therefore which
cells need to be updated. In reverse, we can view this process as the query cell prompting its ancestors to
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evaluate themselves, where the ancestors might then need to prompt ancestors of their own.
Rothermel et al. have speci ed a graph representationfor modelling spreadsheet programs, called the cell
relation graph (CRG) [28]. Figure 10 depicts the CRG for the program of Figure 9. The cell relation graph
represents each individual cell (and thus, the formula for that cell) in a Forms/3 program as a node. Directed
data dependence edges connect each node to all nodes whose results the node immediately requires for its
own internal evaluation. The result is a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
In terms of the cell relation graph, the foregoing testing process model can be viewed as creating a subset
DAG of the original DAG of the cell-relation graph. Following the application of a set of test inputs to a
Forms/3 program, and the identi cation of a query cell, the subset DAG created by that test necessarily
includes at least one node corresponding to a cell that can be evaluated immediately. Additional cells (nodes)
then continue to be evaluated until the speci ed query node can be evaluated. We term the set of nodes
involved in the computation of the value for a given query node an execution DAG.

5.3.2 Using the framework to create a new safe RTS algorithm
The sequence of steps we follow to generate a safe RTS technique A parallel the steps involved in proving
an RTS technique safe:

Five-step algorithm generation process:
1. Based on the requirements of the testing process, propose a regression bias AB for A.
2. Propose a model of the state S and semantic word set , both satisfying the stable semantics
condition (SSC) when AB holds. At the same time, describe the  and : agent sets, as
well as indicators that detect when : events occur if : is nonempty.
3. Construct  and  functions out of the state model S and semantic word set  such that
the graphs so produced capture AB .
4. Transform trace information into abstract execution traces for SafeSpace.
5. Construct an  function that guarantees safety whenever AB holds.
Note that this process can be iterative. While we may know in advance the speci cation of a regression
bias, the best model of semantics or graph structure might not be obvious. Further, repeated iterations
might suggest that the initial regression bias can, in fact, be re ned and still meet our testing requirements,
thus potentially allowing for substantially more ecient algorithms without loss to safety.

Step 1: Propose a regression bias
The creation of a regression bias for a new technique is little di erent than the creation of a SafeSpace
instantiation for an existing technique. In both cases, there exists a set of programs on which the safe RTS
technique is to operate. The regression bias merely speci es the set of attributes possessed by this set of
programs, both positive and negative, as well as any constraints on test cases necessary to preserve the bias.
We begin our construction of a regression bias for spreadsheet languages quite simply: we are interested
in spreadsheet programs that follow Alan Kay's value rule, which states that the value of a cell is de ned
solely by the formula explicitly speci ed for that cell [17]. To be more precise, we are targeting the subset
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Figure 9: Forms/3 program to obtain the root(s) of quadratic and linear equations.
f1: E

f2: a=0?

a1: E
T

a2: read a
a3: X

a

d1: E

b2: read b

2
d2: b-4ac

b3: X

d3: X

b

d

f8:"No solution"

f

e4: d=0?
T

f7: -(b+e)/2a

f9: X

e2: d>0?
T
F
e3:sqrt(d)

f4: d>=0?
T
F

f6:"No solution"

e1: E
b1: E

F

f3: b<>0?
F
T
f5: -c/b

F

e5: 0

g1: E
e6: X

c1: E

e

g2: a=0?
T

c2: read c

F

g3: b<>0?
F
T
g5: -c/b

c3: X

g4: d>=0?
F
T
g7: -(b-e)/2a

c
g6:"No solution"

g8:"No solution"

g9: X

g

Figure 10: Cell relation graph for the Forms/3 program of Figure 9.
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of Forms/3 programs described in Section 5.3, which clearly satis es this value rule. The program in Figure
9 is an example of such a program.
To further re ne our bias, we need to consider the expectations and needs of the users of our safe
RTS technique. Speci cally, we are interested in augmenting a spreadsheet programming environment for
everyday end-users | thus our testers will likely not be professional testers, nor will they have any interest
in understanding testing theory. Such users expect that if they hit a \help me retest this" button, the result
will be fairly fast and will be safe. (Of course, such testers are unlikely to understand the distinction between
safe and unsafe RTS techniques, but a user's expectation that the system will perform a best-e ort attempt
at error detection essentially implies safety.) We could employ the retest-all approach, but that potentially
violates the rapid-response goal. We thus want to nd an ecient safe RTS technique.
Given our de nition of the expected tester, we need to further clarify our bias given our assumptions about
the relation of the programmer and the programming environment. First, since our testers are end-users of
a software product, they are not expected to x faults in the spreadsheet environment itself. Our technique,
therefore, assumes that the spreadsheet environment's evaluation engine performs correctly. Essentially, this
is equivalent to DejaVu, Pythia, and TestTube's assumption that the compiler operates correctly. Note,
however, that DejaVu and the other algorithms must make further equivalence assumptions about other
factors in the external environment { for example, that the operating system is identical between runs.
The spreadsheet evaluation engine provides a front end for all of these factors that is transparent to the
bias, since correct execution of the engine requires that these other aspects hold. Correct execution of
the evaluation engine also incorporates another assumption: all programs halt. However, given the simple
nature of spreadsheet languages, verifying that a program halts requires only that we check for cycles in cell
references. Finally, our bias assumes that P is correct for T : since the program has been executed previously,
we presume that faults previously made visible by T have been detected and corrected.
Altogether, these assumptions form a regression bias R for our new algorithm:

Regression Bias for Spreadsheet Languages | The underlying environment executes correct Forms/3 programs (that possess the constructs outlined above) according to the speci cations
of the language, and the original program P is correct for T .

Step 2: Propose state model, semantic word set, and agent sets
Given our regression bias, our state S consists solely of the values assigned to the cells of the spreadsheet,
including formulas, input values, and cells changed in the process of evaluation. The transient state X
consists of all cells not contained in the execution DAG for the query cell. In this case, X is a well-de ned
set of values, primarily because our language is purely declarative with no side e ects.
Our semantic word set consists of the cell formulas in the spreadsheet program. This can, of course,
involve words that correspond to requests for user input. The valid agent set consists of the set of correct
behaviors associated with the evaluation engine. Because the evaluation engine shields the user program
from the outside environment, all rogue agents result only from incorrect behavior in the evaluation engine
(although incorrect behavior of the engine could arise from external events).
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Step 3: Construct  and  functions
The  and  functions for our algorithm create CRGs. The  function is quite simple for this algorithm:
semantic words are related one-to-one to formulas in individual cells. The  function creates directed edges
between cells that contain sources and uses of variables, similar to those found in the CRG; however, for
our algorithm, we reverse the direction of these edges: this change makes the graph-walk procedure simpler.
Although individual cells can contain small programs themselves, we have chosen not to consider the internals
of cell formulas in this algorithm, in the interest of maintaining a rapid response time. Our  function thus
forms a DAG out of the nodes created by , just as the cell-relation graph is itself a DAG.

Step 4: Transform trace information into abstract execution traces
As described earlier, the execution of a test case for a Forms/3 program involves applying input values and
then selecting a query cell. Obviously, the application of input values can only change parts of the graph
that are dependent on the changed values. The evaluation engine need only check those parts of the graph.
Thus, an execution trace for a test case is a subgraph G of P 's graph formulation G (which is itself
a coarse version of P 's CRG). We can represent such a trace simply as a bit vector with 1's for all nodes
contained in the execution trace. Note that these traces represent partial orders over cells in a graph.
00

Step 5: Construct the  function
In proofs of safety, the , , and  functions are intrinsically tied together; a  function may be chosen such
that a convenient  function exists. In the algorithm creation process, however, we have chosen to separate
the  and  function creation step from the  function creation step, because here, we wish to emphasize
modeling of the program before concerning ourselves with proving equivalence. Of course, diculties in the
creation of a valid  function can lead to a reevaluation of the  and  functions created previously.
In this case, given the  and  functions, there is a clear choice for the  function. Just as with DejaVu,
we could use lexical equivalence as our ; such a choice is simple and possesses clear semantics. However, we
are primarily interested in creating a fast safe RTS algorithm, in interest of maintaining the rapid response
time demanded by users of spreadsheets. Thus, instead of having  determine lexical equivalence between
cell formulas, we will keep an extra bit of information for each cell to indicate whether that cell's formula has
been modi ed. These bits are set to \1" when the cells' formulas are rst entered, and set to \0" after the
user has validated the cell by exercising its incoming dependencies [28] executed the safe RTS function. If a
cell's formula is subsequently altered, its bit is reset to \1". Thus, our  function needs merely to shift bits
out of two bit strings to detect \inequivalence". If the bit vector representing changes contains a 1 where
the bit vector representing the execution DAG for a test case contains a 1, that test case needs to be rerun.
Up to this point, we have not shown that our chosen , , and  functions suce as structure and
equivalence functions in SafeSpace: because the proof is rather simple we have delayed it until  was de ned.
 and  clearly capture the semantic behavior of spreadsheet programs: their relation to CRGs guarantees
this. The key to the proof thus lies entirely with the  function. As we stated earlier, an  function must
guarantee that given identical start states, equivalent nodes under  produce equivalent non-transient states;
the  function given here clearly achieves this goal as it indicates equivalence only when the node has not
been altered by the user, and thus represents the same local function. From a more global perspective, we
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see that this algorithm is safe because it excludes only test cases whose trace in P contains no nodes that
have been changed to create P . Because new edges can only arise when nodes are changed, if no nodes in a
trace have changed, we know that the test case has an equivalent execution DAG in both P and P . Thus,
the behaviors of P and P on that test case are necessarily equivalent.
0

0

0

5.3.3 Test Selection: a Safe Heuristic
The SafeSpace algorithm focuses on constructing a data structure that is used in selecting dangerous edges.
We have not yet discussed how test case selection is performed, given those edges, by our spreadsheet
algorithm. Spreadsheet languages have some interesting traits that make this selection ecient.
As we stated earlier, there are two levels of granularity in most spreadsheet languages: inter-cell dependencies and formulas inside of cells. Our algorithm focuses on inter-cell dependencies. As such, a particular
trace as de ned for our technique might apply to a large number of input-output relations. For instance,
there are only two distinct traces for the quadratic equation solver, and yet there are many possible test
cases required to test boundary conditions and ensure the correct computation of roots by that program. In
more complex spreadsheet programs with less interconnected graphs, there can be a large number of distinct
traces; however, it is still often the case that there are far more test cases than unique test traces. Thus, we
can \bin" test cases before the algorithm is run to create a more ecient implementation. We keep in storage
a list of all unique test traces seen previously; as we add test cases, we check to see if the trace of each test
case is unique. If the trace is unique, we add it to the list; if the trace is not unique, we add that test case
to a list associated with the trace. After we run the SafeSpace implementation for spreadsheet languages
we run our test selection process on the traces rather than the test cases: in this way, we avoid checking
a trace for each test case, and potentially reduce our work signi cantly. Clearly, this choice is safe. For
programs with substantial numbers of test cases executing identical formulas, this optimization can produce
substantially greater eciency.

5.3.4 Example of the Application of the Algorithm to a Forms/3 Program
Figure 11 presents a simple Forms/3 program. Because we cannot clearly represent input cells as speci ed in
the visual format of Forms/3, we have put \read" primitives in cells that require user input. This program
does not compute any meaningful functions, but it suces to demonstrate our RTS algorithm.
Alongside the Forms/3 program is its graph representation as speci ed by the  and  functions previously
described. As we noted in Section 5.3.2, this representation depicts inter-cell dependencies, except that the
directions of the arrows have been reversed. Thus, edges from a node point to all nodes whose associated
cells are referenced in that node's local formula. The nodes in the graph have been labeled with the names
of the cells they represent, as de ned by the Forms/3 program.
As an example, we consider two test cases. The rst is a query on only variable f, the second is a query
on only variable g. As we discussed, traces include all edges traversed in the course of a computation of the
value of the query variable. Thus, the trace for test case 1 (on f) contains edges a1, a2, b1, b2, d, and f. The
trace for test case 2 (on g) contains edges a4, b3, c1, c2, e, and g.
Suppose that a modi ed version of this program has been created. This version P is presented in Figure
12 with its graph representation G . To generate this program, we added a new cell x and referenced that
cell in the formula for f. Thus, all nodes other than x and f have their change bit set to 0; x and f have their
0

0
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g
e
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g

e
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Figure 11: Left: a Forms/3 program; right: the graph representation G of the program.
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Figure 12: Left: version 2 of the Forms/3 program; right: the graph representation G of this version.
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Figure 13: The signature graph Gsig of G and G .
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change bit set to 1. We then execute the SafeSpace instantiation as described previously on graphs G and
G , producing Gsig as shown in Figure 13. Note that, because f was altered to create P , the arrow from
Start to f is directed immediately to Select. Thus, we can immediately see that test case 1, which contained
edge f, should be selected for retest, while test case 2 need not be re-validated.
One of the main advantages of the safe RTS technique presented here is that it can easily be incorporated
into a testing environment such as the environment described in [28]. A reasonable implementation of this
algorithm in that environment would execute the safe RTS algorithm, run the required test cases, and
highlight the query variables requiring revalidation. This would direct the user's attention to the values that
might have been changed as a result of changes. Thus, safe RTS not only increases the responsiveness of a
revalidation command, but also focuses a user's attention on potential trouble spots.
0

0

6 Conclusions
In the past two decades, over twenty distinct regression test selection algorithms have been proposed, utilizing
a wide range of approaches (see [25] for a list). Yet in all this work, only two papers [5, 25] can be said to
consider regression test selection from a more theoretical standpoint. This paper attempts to extend our
understanding of the theoretical foundations of regression test selection, focusing on safe RTS techniques.
In establishing a framework for safe RTS, we establish what is, essentially, a speci cation for how a
safe RTS algorithm should be designed, and clarify the contracts that safe RTS testing must make, thereby
allowing software testers and clients to more readily agree as to what testing standards have been met. We
also believe that this framework can make the task of designing a new safe regression test selection algorithm
easier for a researcher or test engineer in need of a safe RTS solution for a unique testing scenario. In this
context, we showed that safe RTS algorithms can be designed almost entirely by only slotting functions in
the generalized safe RTS algorithm. Our emphasis on the process of the technique was intended to further
facilitate the practical usefulness of the framework.
So far, however, we have not discussed the place of safe RTS testing in the global scheme of software
engineering. In Section 2, we suggested that the purpose of safe RTS testing was just to save money, or
somewhat equivalently, time; this is indeed a valid use of safe RTS techniques and, in the past, the primary
justi cation for their use. Nonetheless, safe RTS techniques represent only one branch of regression testing
philosophies. Safe RTS algorithms operate on the assumption that test cases are associated with faults and
thus, that the goal of testing is only to nd faults. There is nothing wrong with this goal, and if safe RTS
algorithms can help us nd faults at less expense, then clearly it would be foolish not to use them. On the
other hand, nding faults is not the only means of improving software quality, and possibly, nding faults it
not even the best approach.
Safe RTS algorithms have deeper uses, however, in the maintenance phase of the software life cycle. RTS
algorithms, in general, let us partition our testing resources more eciently with a little advance work. By
de ning a \safe space" in the code, safe RTS techniques let us exclude portions of code from further testing
with fault- nding techniques because their usage tells us that those domains are behaviorally equivalent.
Thus, coupled with adequate test suites, safe RTS techniques can provide justi cation that faults are not
likely to be located in excluded code. This can give testers a measure of the utility of performing di erent
types of additional testing. Having employed a safe RTS technique, a tester knows that executing tests over
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the excluded section of the program will likely not be of much use. A tester can then allocate more resources
to other activities such as reliability assessment, or increasing test coverage on areas known to have high
complexity measures.
Consider that DejaVu, for example, has been shown to reduce the cost of retesting by 75-88% on the
50,000 line program Empire[22]. Further, the technique displays a tendency to produce greater savings as
programs grow larger. The chunk of regression testing time saved can be reallocated to completely di erent
validation processes. On the other hand, while unsafe RTS techniques perform a function similar to that
of safe RTS techniques, they do not, in general, justify the same con dence levels. Thus, while an unsafe
technique might cut the size of the test suite by a signi cant amount, we might not be justi ed, as we are
with safe techniques, in instituting processes of testing over other domains, because we have not adequately
tested the code of greatest concern. Clearly, safe RTS algorithms belong in a tester's toolbox as they provide
analytic guidance on how to increase the quality of software with limited resources.
Of course, primarily, safe RTS techniques are intended to provide safe savings in software engineering
costs. As evidenced in experiments performed by Rothermel and Harrold [24], Chen, Vo, and Rosenblum
[11], and Vokolos and Frankl [30], such savings can be made for realistic programs without missing faults.
As testing methods mature and as the demand for post development testing increases, it seems a given that
safe RTS analysis methods will be fundamental for later-life software maintenance.
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